Transforming the Current Thai Political Conflict to a Peaceful Society by Phumcharoen, Ranatchai
The University of San Francisco
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Master's Theses Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects
Fall 12-16-2011
Transforming the Current Thai Political Conflict to
a Peaceful Society
Ranatchai Phumcharoen
University of San Francisco, ranatchai@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/thes
Part of the Asian Studies Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @
Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital
repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.
Recommended Citation
Phumcharoen, Ranatchai, "Transforming the Current Thai Political Conflict to a Peaceful Society" (2011). Master's Theses. 7.
https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/7
 
 
 
 
 
University of San Francisco 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transforming the Current Thai Political Conflict                                       
to a Peaceful Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Present to  
The Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences 
Master‘s Program in International Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirement for the Degree 
Master of Arts in International Studies 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Ranatchai Phumcharoen  
December 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ii 
 
 
 
Transforming the Current Thai Political Conflict to a Peaceful Society 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements of the Degree 
 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
In 
 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 
 
 
 
by 
Ranatchai Phumcharoen 
December 2011 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO 
 
 
 
 
 
Under the guidance and approval of the committee, and approval by all the members, 
this thesis has been accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
 
 
Approved: 
 
Thesis Advisor    Date 
 
------------------------------------------  ------------------------- 
 
Academic Director    Date 
 
------------------------------------------  ------------------------- 
 
Dean of Arts and Sciences   Date 
 
------------------------------------------  ------------------------- 
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study explores the current Thai political conflict which began in 2005 and 
continues in 2011. This conflict is different from the nation‘s past political conflicts, 
which were conflicts between people and the government. On the contrary, the current 
conflict is a conflict between Thais who share different political ideologies. Many 
scholars have explained causes and effects of the conflict on Thai society. However, 
currently, only a few scholars have proposed solutions to the conflict. Therefore, this 
is a challenge in order to investigate the current conflict and figure out sustainable 
means to transform the conflict and build peace in the society. This study posits that 
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and the narrowing of socioeconomic gaps can transform 
the current Thai political conflict and build peace in Thai society.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Traditionally, Thailand has largely been a peaceful nation and Thais lived in 
relative harmony and unity for many years, until 2005. The country was known as the 
―land of smiles‖ (Marshall, 2010, para. 1; Voigt, 2010; Vox Populi, 2011). Since 
1932, the nation changed the political regime from an absolute monarchy to a 
democracy. Thailand had never experienced a ―deep-rooted‖ conflict as a divided 
society until 2005 (Fisher et al., 2000, p. 6); the conflict continues to the present. As 
Sukhumbhand Paribatra—the present Bangkok governor—mentioned, the nation ―had 
conflicts in 1973, 1976, and 1992, but this is unlike anything we‘ve seen before‖ (as 
cited in Voigt, 2010, para. 2). The past three conflicts were people‘s struggles against 
the government. In 1973, a student-led uprising led to the ouster of a military 
government and, in 1976, there were widespread protests against economic hardships 
and fears of a possible military coup; both resulted in massacres of student 
demonstrators. In 1992, a largely middle class uprising brought down another military 
government. However, the current conflict is a conflict between Thais and Thais. 
Many studies have explained the starting point of the current conflict. Ex-
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was a symbol of modernization and reform. He 
brought many drastic changes to the country. Before he was a prime minister, he 
proposed an alternative policy under a slogan ―Think new, act new for every Thai‖ 
(Walaya as cited in Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 64) to bail out the nation from the 
1997 economic crisis. He became the new hope for the country. He acquired large 
support from Thais, which allowed him to win the 2001 election (Dalpino, 2010; 
Hewison, 2010; Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009; Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008). 
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When Thaksin became prime minister, he led changes in the country. One 
important thing was introducing populist policies. These policies provided budget and 
resources to improve the quality of life of the poor. As a result of the populist policies, 
he acquired favor and support from the poor in return. As a result, he won the 2005 
election with a landslide and became the prime minister for his second term 
(Albritton, 2006; Dalpino, 2010; Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009; Phatharathananunth, 
2008; Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008; Pongsudhirak, 2008).    
Thaksin controlled a large majority of seats in parliament. Therefore, his 
government was a strong government. The advantage for the government was that it 
could easily implement its policies conveniently. On the other hand, opposition 
parties were concerned at the inability to challenge these policies or even debate the 
prime minister in parliament. The government was accused of corruption, abuse of 
power, and authoritarianism. Consequently, the society was divided into two sides: 
those for and against ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. This split symbolizes an ideological 
divide among Thais. The majority of those supporting ex-Prime Minister Thaksin are 
the poor, who appreciate his populist policies, whereas the majority of those against 
ex-Prime Minister Thaksin are the urban middle class who are discontented about his 
abuse of power and corruption (―Profile,‖ 2011). This conflict between the Thai 
people led to political deadlock. Therefore, the 2006 coup took place in order to 
resolve the political conflict. The military toppled the Thaksin administration and 
established an interim government.  
A year later, the interim government organized the 2007 election. A pro ex-
Prime Minister Thaksin party, the People‘s Power Party (PPP), acquired a majority of 
votes and assumed power (Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, p. 470; Ockey, 2008, p. 
25). In 2008, the People‘s Alliance for Democracy (PAD, or Yellow Shirts) protested 
3 
 
 
against the government. The government could not resolve the conflict. At this time, 
the Supreme Court and the Constitution Court had crucial roles in resolving the 
conflict by terminating two prime ministers because one violated the Constitution by 
acquiring income from a television station and the other because of the 2007 election 
fraud (Albritton, 2006; Connors & Hewison, 2008; Dalpino, 2010; Hewison, 2010; 
Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009; Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008; Pongsudhirak, 2008; 
Prasirtsuk, 2009, 2010; Winichakul, 2008).  
In 2008, Thai society got a new government led by the Democrat Party (DP), 
which was a leading opposition party (Prasirtsuk, 2009, 2010). As a result, a pro ex-
Prime Minister Thaksin group, called the United Front for Democracy against 
Dictatorship (UDD, or the Red Shirts), protested against the newly-installed 
government (Prasirtsuk, 2010, p. 204). In early 2010, there were large-scale protests 
in Bangkok, and riots in many provinces. The government managed to end the 
protests. However, the government and Thai society could not transform the conflict 
and build peace in the society yet (Charoensinolarn, 2010; Dalpino, 2010, 2011; 
Hewison, 2010; Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009; Prasirtsuk, 2009, 2010). 
In May 2011, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva dissolved parliament. An 
election was held. The Pheu Thai Party (PTP, or For Thais Party), which is the latest 
incarnation of ex-Prime Minister Thaksin‘s party, won the election and acquired the 
majority of seats in parliament. Yingluck Shinawatra, who is Thaksin‘s youngest 
sister, became the prime minister. The DP then became an opposition party 
(Hookway, 2011). Two challenges for the government and Thai society are 
transforming the conflict and building peace in the nation.  
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Framework of the Study 
Background and Need for the Study 
The Thai political conflict is a deep-rooted conflict in Thai society. There have 
been many studies illustrating the causes and results of the conflict. However, these 
studies did not address how to transform the political conflict and build peace in the 
society. Moreover, the conflict is a current issue. Therefore, the challenges of this 
study are to find resolutions for transforming the divided society into a peaceful 
nation.  
Currently, the society and scholars are concerned about reconciliation and 
rehabilitation. For example, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin apologized and forgave his 
opposing parties (Traisuriyathanma, 2011). Initial reconciliation models were 
proposed to the society. Furthermore, the Truth for Reconciliation Commission of 
Thailand (TRCT) is working on this issue (Satha-Anand as cited in ―Surakiart,‖ 2011; 
Sathirathai as cited in ―Surakiart,‖ 2011; ―Thaksin,‖ 2011; Wasi as cited in ―Unlock,‖ 
2011). However, some Thais and conflicting parties do not commit to reconciliation. 
People and conflicting parties are still divided and do not perceive conflict in positive 
ways. Therefore, the society has to commit to mobilizing reconciliation. Conflicting 
parties have to perceive conflict in positive ways rather than remaining adversaries for 
the other side (Coy, 2009; Fisher et al., 2000).  
This paper is going to explore the roots of the conflict and investigate how to 
transform the conflict and build peace. The paper envisions that reconciliation, 
rehabilitation, and narrowing the socioeconomic gaps can transform the conflict and 
build sustainable peace in Thai society. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the current Thai political conflict, 
which began in 2005 and continues today. This conflict involves large numbers of 
people and has vast effects on Thai society. This study aims to understand the causes 
and results of the conflict. In addition, it investigates how to transform the conflict 
and build peace in Thailand.  
At present, the society is still divided. The government wants to transform the 
conflict, but conflict reconciliation has not yet taken place. Therefore, this research 
may be useful to Thai society to help it recognize and commit to transformation and 
peace building. In addition, this research may support conflict transformation and the 
peace building process, which the government aims to implement.  
Research Question and Hypothesis 
This study‘s research question is how to transform the current Thai political 
conflict and build peace in Thai society? The hypothesis for the study is that 
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and the narrowing of socioeconomic gaps can transform 
the current Thai political conflict and build peace in the society.  
Theoretical Framework 
 The theoretical framework of this study is based on peace and conflict 
theories. Theoretical frameworks regarding nonviolence, conflict reconciliation, and 
conflict transformation, provided guidelines for this research.  
The PAD and the UDD asserted that their to topple the government were 
based on nonviolence. In addition, the government tried to maintain balance between 
the rule of law and compromise. Even though conflicting parties asserted that they 
were committed to nonviolence, riots and violence took place in the society. 
Protestors, officers, and innocent bystanders were injured and killed.  
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The Peace Information Center described nonviolence in ―19 Secrets of 
Nonviolence,‖ as follows: 
nonviolence is an effective way to deal with conflict which will 
liberate us from the vicious cycle of violence; it is the use of social, 
economic, and political power for the transformation of society; and it 
is a way whereby everyone can empower him/herself. (as cited in 
Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 160) 
 
However, there is no guarantee that social movements which practice nonviolent 
actions will not be met with violence (Johansen, 2009; King, n.d.; The Peace 
Information Center as cited in Satha-Anand, 1999). In addition, if nonviolence is used 
together with violence, the legitimacy of nonviolent parts of the movement will 
decrease, whereas the legitimacy of the other side to use violence will increase (The 
Peace Information Center as cited in Satha-Anand, 1999). Though the tactics by both 
sides in the conflict were never completely nonviolent, the stated commitment to 
nonviolence may be useful for the Truth and Reconciliation process and could help 
increase understanding as to the causes of violence during the past six years.   
Any conflict has multiple origins. For example, social conflicts are often 
rooted in injustice and inequality (Coy, 2009). Therefore, in order to transform the 
current conflict, Thai society has to understand the causes of the conflict. The current 
conflict relates to several issues, including socioeconomic inequality, development 
gaps between urban and rural areas, corruption, and vote buying (Dalpino, 2010; 
Hewison, 2010).  
In order to transform a conflict, both parties have to have positive views of the 
conflict‘s potential in achieving their goals. They have to perceive that the conflict 
will lead to positive changes in the country (Coy, 2009; Fisher et al., 2000). 
According to Miall (2004), a society has to understand ―types of transformation,‖ of 
which there are five (p. 9). Three types of transformation may be compatible with the 
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Thai political conflict, including structural, issue, and personal transformations. 
Structural transformations change the relationship between conflicting parties from 
asymmetric to symmetric relations. Issue transformations move incompatible 
conflicting parties‘ demands to compatible ones. Personal transformations make 
changes in personal perceptions. 
Reconciliation is a way to support conflict transformation. It provides a place 
for conflicting parties to transform past conflict to a harmonious relationship. It deals 
with truth and mercy, and justice and peace (Lederach, 2003b).        
Methodology 
 This study used a triangulation of methods, including policy analysis, content 
analysis, and interviews. These methods helped the study acquire comprehensive 
information that can answer the research question: How to transform the current Thai 
political conflict and build peace in Thai society?  
This research explored the Abhisit and Yingluck government policies in order 
to understand the positions of the government in relation to the conflict. When the 
study began in early 2011, Abhisit was the prime minister. He dissolved parliament 
and organized an election in July 2011. The PTP acquired the majority vote and 
Yingluck became the prime minister. However, despite this peaceful and legal 
transfer of power, the conflict continues. Therefore, the researcher investigated these 
contrasting policies of these two governments. Furthermore, the study examined the 
media, including newspapers, radio and television, and social media, to understand 
their influences on the conflict and Thai society. Lastly, the researcher interviewed a 
Thai scholar and five average Thai citizens in order to understand contrasting 
perspectives on the conflict and reconciliation. 
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Limitations of the Study 
 The study explored the current Thai political conflict, which is a sensitive 
issue in the society. Therefore, the researcher conducted this research using academic 
integrity and following the Thai Constitution, law, tradition, and culture. All findings 
in this paper were derived from academic sources.  
 The researcher examined various media in order to explore their influences on 
Thai society. Scholars argued that some media outlets take sides and influence 
people‘s attitudes on the conflict. However, examining the media is a sensitive issue. 
In order to avoid libel, the researcher indicated positive influences of the media on the 
society. The researcher did not directly illustrate negative influences of the media on 
the public. However, the researcher referred to and illustrated scholars‘ arguments and 
the media‘s opinions toward other media instead.      
This study aims to serve the national interest by studying how to transform the 
conflict within the nation and to build peace in the society. The goal is successfully 
transforming the conflict for all Thais and the country. The study limits and reserves 
the right to use this paper for academic purposes only and absolutely refrains from 
any political purpose.  
Significance of the Study 
 The current Thai political conflict has continued for six years. The conflict 
needs to be resolved. This research explores the conflict in order to understand the 
causes and results of the conflict. Moreover, the research investigates how to 
transform the conflict and build peace in the country.  
The study‘s findings may be useful for Thai authorities to resolve the conflict. 
In addition, the findings may contribute to conflicting parties understanding each 
other, perceiving conflict in positive ways, and collaborating to transform the conflict. 
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This study may facilitate Thais in better recognizing the ―divisiveness‖ of their 
society, and in cooperating with each other to resolve the conflict (C. Satha-Anand, 
personal communication, September 8, 2011). 
Definition of Terms 
People‘s Alliance for Democracy (PAD, or the Yellow Shirts): A group led by 
those against ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. They wear yellow as the group‘s symbol, 
and Thais call them the Yellow Shirts.    
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD, or the Red Shirts): A 
group led by those for ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. They wear red as the group‘s 
symbol, and Thais call them the Red Shirts. 
The Black Shirts: They were unidentified forces who appeared when officers 
encountered UDD‘s protestors. The Black Shirts started to use violence first, and this 
led to violent confrontations between officers and protestors. The government and the 
UDD suspected each other of supporting the unidentified forces. 
The Multicolor Shirts: Members of the Bangkok middle class who ―[were] not 
pro- or anti-government, they simply [wanted] the government to shut down the reds 
[UDD]‖ (River, 2010, para. 6). 
Watermelon soldiers: The group of soldiers who support the ex-Prime 
Minister Thaksin and the Red Shirts (UDD). People call them ―watermelon‖ soldiers 
because they wear an army green uniform, but support the Red Shirts (Chambers, 
2010, p. 843). 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Many studies have illustrated the causes and results of the current Thai 
political conflict. However, previous studies did not provide solutions in order to 
transform the conflict and build peace in Thai society. Moreover, some scholars have 
criticized the conflict based on their own pre-conceptions which lacked a 
comprehensive understanding of Thai politics. In addition, the conflict is a current 
issue that requires immediate resolution. Therefore, this research explores how to 
transform Thai political conflict and build peace in the nation. The first section in this 
chapter examines the causes of the current conflict. The second section explains the 
current conflict and its effects on Thai society. The third section investigates peace 
and conflict theories. The fourth section explores current reconciliation ideologies in 
Thai society.        
Review of the Literature 
The Causes of the Current Conflict 
Establishment of the Thai Ruk Thai Party. 
Thaksin Shinawatra has been a famous politician in Thai society since the 
1997 economic crisis (Dalpino, 2010, p. 259). According to Kitirianglarp and 
Hewison (2009), in 1997, many Thais suffered from the economic crisis, during 
which thousands of businesses closed, and 1.48 million people were unemployed. The 
DP, as the ruling party, adopted the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank‘s neo-liberal economic policies, but these policies failed to stimulate the 
Thai economy. Consequently, people were dissatisfied with the government, and 
conflicts between the government and social movements increased significantly 
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(Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, p. 454). In 1998, Thaksin, ―disgruntled capitalists,‖ 
NGO leaders, and the left-leaning ―Octobrists‖—former university student activists 
who protested against the Thai military and authoritarianism in October 1973 and 
October 1976—established the Thai Ruk Thai Party (TRT) (Pasuk & Baker as cited in 
Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, p. 455; Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 63). As 
Kitirianglarp and Hewison (2009) explained, the Octobrists have played major roles 
in Thai society. They are scholars, intellectuals, NGO leaders, and politicians. 
Therefore, they appealed to the public to support the TRT (p. 455). Moreover, 
Hewison (2010) argued, Thaksin successfully got his business allies and even some 
business rivals to support him (p. 123). The TRT proposed alternative policies against 
the neo-liberal policy of the government (Hewison, 2010, p. 121) under a challenging 
campaign ―Think new, act new for every Thai,‖ which represented modernization and 
reform (Walaya as cited in Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 64). Therefore, the TRT 
and Thaksin were the new hopes of the nation. People believed that Thaksin could 
resolve the economic crisis. His popularity rose to 70 percent before the 2001 election 
(The Nation as cited in Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 66). 
The Thai Ruk Thai Government. 
Thaksin led the TRT to victory in the 2001 election. The TRT formed a 
government, and Thaksin became prime minister (Pongsudhirak, 2008). He 
implemented populist, pro-poor policies—cheap health care, agrarian debt relief, 
village funds, and people‘s banks—nationwide (Albritton, 2006, pp. 141-142; 
Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, p. 458; Phatharathananunth, 2008, p. 117; 
Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 63). Some populist policies, such as village funds, 
were criticized for creating huge public debts to the nation (Boonma, 2011; Plainthit, 
2011; ―Thailand,‖ 2005). However, some policies did benefit the poor, such as the 
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One Tambon One Product (OTOP) policy, which has promoted local products of sub-
districts to domestic and global markets. These anti-Thaksin scholars failed to 
acknowledge such successes, however.  
Socioeconomic inequality and the Thai Ruk Thai landslide. 
Ex-Prime Minister Thaksin‘s populist policies gained him and the TRT many 
votes from rural people, especially in the northern and northeastern regions where the 
majority of Thais live. The policy successfully served grassroots‘ demands, which 
were neglected in the past. As Dalpino (2010) explained, the country‘s economic 
policies have been heavily centralized. Even though previous governments 
acknowledged the need for decentralization, it failed to fairly distribute 
socioeconomic benefits to the poor and rural areas. However, the Thaksin government 
responded to the demands of the poor and implemented the populist policies to serve 
their expectations (Dalpino, 2010, p. 259). As a result, the government gained greater 
support from the poor. 
Because of Thaksin‘s popularity, the dominance of the TRT, and the 
government‘s successful economic policy, the TRT won a landslide victory during the 
2005 election (Albritton, 2006, p. 141; Hewison, 2010, p. 123; Pongsudhirak, 2008). 
However, Phatharathananunth (2008) argued that it was the ―power of its [the TRT] 
money‖ which also contributed to the electoral victory (p. 118). For example, in order 
to increase its majority in parliament, the TRT convinced some members of 
parliament from other parties to defect and convinced three smaller parties to merge 
into the TRT. According to the newspaper Matichon Weekly and Ockey, the party 
provided these members of parliament with ―monthly allowances and substantial 
election funds‖ (as cited in Phatharathananunth, 2008, p. 108), though these scholars 
did not mention the sources of this money. The TRT acquired a substantial majority 
13 
 
 
of votes and won more than three fourths of the parliament seats (Albritton, 2006, p. 
141; Pongsudhirak, 2008, p. 142), and Thaksin was the first Thai prime minister who 
was re-elected to a second term (Hewison, 2010, p. 123).   
The TRT gained 377 out of 500 seats in the parliament, whereas the 
opposition parties gained 123 seats. (Albritton, 2006, p. 141; National Election 
Commission as cited in Phatharathananunth, 2008, p. 118). The victory of the TRT 
―ended the traditional system of coalition governments‖ (Albritton, 2006, p. 142). In a 
country accustomed to coalition governments, this complete control by one party of 
both the government and parliament led to accusations that Thaksin was an 
authoritarian leader (Pye & Schaffar as cited in Connors & Hewison, 2008, p. 5). This 
overwhelming political dominance resulted in serious corruption (Kitirianglarp & 
Hewison, 2009, p. 467; Pongsudhirak, 2008, p. 142; Prasirtsuk, 2010, p. 203), 
including government support for his personal businesses, questionable ―privatisation 
of state enterprises‖ (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008, p. 66), abuses of power, as well as 
challenging and disrespecting, the monarch (Hewison, 2010, p. 127; Kitirianglarp & 
Hewison, 2009, p. 467; Prasirtsuk, 2010, p. 203; Winichakul, 2008, p. 30).  
Hewison (2010) explained that opposition to the ―Thaksin regime‖ (Chirmsak 
as cited in Hewison, 2010, p. 120) was because it challenged the power of the ―‗old 
elite‘, ‗old oligarchy‘‖ (p. 127). Hewison criticized the old oligarchy, but he did not 
give much attention to some weak points of the Thaksin regime, such as the 
combination of ―corporate-dominated politics‖ (Pye & Schaffar as cited in Connors & 
Hewison, 2008, p. 5) with questionable populist policies. For example, Prime Minister 
Thaksin did not operate businesses or hold corporate stock in enterprises effected by 
government policies, but his family did both. For example, the government 
formulated policies that benefited Shinawatra‘s businesses (Pinthong, 2009). As 
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Pasuk and Baker noted, Prime Minister Thaksin ―seemed unable to distinguish 
between personal and family interests and those of the state‖ (as cited in Hewison, 
2010, p. 124). Moreover, the Thaksin administration seemed to acquire benefits from 
privatizing public utilities to transnational capitalists, such as attempting to sell the 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, p. 460). 
In addition, the government implemented populist policies in order to appeal for 
support from the rural poor, rather than resolving the underlying social inequality 
(Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, p. 461), which would have provided national long-
term benefits. As Pongpaichit and Baker (2008) explained, Thaksin integrated the 
seemingly contradictory policies of corporate dominance and helping the poor 
because he was ―a business politician who had adopted populist policies as a strategy 
to win popular acquiescence for reforms designed primarily in the interests of capital‖ 
(p. 66).   
The polarizing policies of Thaksin‘s government resulted in increasing 
conflict within Thai society. By 2005, the society was divided into two: those for and 
against Thaksin, a conflict that remains to this day. 
The Current Conflict and Its Effects on Thai Society 
Bringing down the Thaksin administration. 
With the overwhelming majority of seats in parliament controlled by the TRT, 
the opposition did not have enough votes and power to provide checks and balances 
on the Thaksin government. The opposition parties could not organize a censure the 
prime minister or otherwise constrain his actions (Albritton, 2006, p. 141). According 
to the Thai Constitution of 1997, opposition parties needed at least two fifths of votes, 
or 200 votes, from the members of parliament in order to organize a censure against a 
prime minister (―The Thai,‖ 1997). However, opposition parties had only 123 votes, 
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which was not enough to organize a censure. Therefore, some scholars pointed out 
that the prime minister abused his power through corruption and formulating policies 
that benefited his family‘s businesses (Hewison, 2010; Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 
2009; Pongpaichit & Baker, 2008; Pongsudhirak, 2008). As a result, many people 
considered the prime minister an authoritarian leader, and there social movements 
emerged to oust him from office. These political forces emerged from outside the 
parliament, which Satha-Anand called ―non-electoral democratic powers‖ (as cited in 
―Surakiart,‖ 2011, para. 12). For example, technocrats criticized the prime minister 
through media like newspapers, radio, and television. Moreover, there was a large-
scale social movement against him led by the PAD. As Ukrist pointed out, ―[t]he PAD 
… was re-established in February 2006 following the controversial sale of the 
[Thaksin] Shinawatra family‘s Shin Corp‖ (as cited in Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 
2009, p. 467), was an important player in overthrowing the prime minister.  
The PAD used ―[strong] royalist and nationalist rhetoric‖ (Hewison, 2010, p. 
120). It acquired major support from Bangkok‘s middle class, activists, NGO leaders, 
and trade unionists, rather than the rural poor who favored populist policies (Connors 
& Hewison, 2008; Dalpino, 2010; Hewison, 2010; Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009). In 
addition, Winichakul argued that the PAD had a pessimistic view toward politicians 
and rural voters. The PAD considers that ―all politicians are corrupt, elections are 
essentially ‗undemocratic‘ as they are dominated by vote-buying, and now believe 
that ‗real democracy‘ can only be achieved through moral and ethical rule‖ (as cited 
in Hewison, 2010, p. 125). While such perspectives may appear to indicate an 
authoritarian mindset of some of Thaksin‘s conservative opponents, the PAD pursued 
a campaign in support of ―clean politics‖ against vote buying and corruption 
(Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, p. 468; Prasirtsuk, 2010, p. 207), a challenge for 
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Thai society (Tejapira as cited in ―The War,‖ 2010). While Hewison‘s label of the 
PAD as strongly royalist also implies authoritarian tendency, he fails to understand 
the importance of the monarchy to Thais and respect they have for the institution. The 
PAD mobilized hundreds of thousands of people to protest against the government 
(Pye & Schaffar as cited in Connors & Hewison, 2008, p. 5). The government and the 
society could not resolve the conflict, and this resulted in a political deadlock. Prime 
Minister Thaksin believed organizing an election would resolve the conflict. 
Therefore, he dissolved parliament and held the 2006 election. However, all 
opposition parties did not participate in this election. After the election, the 
Constitution Court ―nullified‖ it (Pongsudhirak, 2008, p. 141) because of electoral 
fraud (Ockey, 2008, p. 21). Finally, a coup took place (Pongsudhirak, 2008), which 
resulted in ex-Prime Minister Thaksin living in exile. His $2.2 billion in assets were 
confiscated (Prasirtsuk, 2010, p. 206).  
Some scholars asserted that this was a conflict between the Thaksin regime 
and the old oligarchy. They explained that the old oligarchy supported the PAD and 
ordered the military to overthrow the government (Connors & Hewison, 2008; 
Hewison, 2010; Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009). However, they did not consider 
another aspect: the PAD and the military were not controlled by the old oligarchy. 
The PAD and the military were motivated out of their own desire to protect what they 
saw as the national interest and national security because the parliamentary system 
had become a vehicle for Thaksin‘s ideological and personal goals and the ―political 
system [broke] down‖ (Dalpino, 2010, p. 260). The military, therefore, considered it 
its duty and responsibility to protect the nation by siding with the large middle class 
protests against the government, staging the coup when political deadlock and strong 
conflict intensified. As Connors and Hewison (2008) asserted, this coup was a ―good 
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coup‖ for the middle class (p. 3). In addition, according to coup supporters, it was 
necessary because ―it saved the country from the clutches of authoritarianism‖ 
(Pitsuwan as cited in Connors & Hewison, 2008, p. 4). Others argued, however, that 
―the coup was not inevitable,‖ and it was a ―bad coup‖ for the poor, because it 
removed the government that delivered populist policies and provided the poor with a 
political voice (Connors & Hewison, 2008, p. 4). 
Anek Laothammatas explained the ―Thai style democratic approach, which is 
called a tale of two democracies (two-city democracies)‖ (as cited in Callahan, 2005, 
p. 106; as cited in ―Democratic,‖ n.d., p. 103). His approach presents the different 
political behaviors between the rural poor and the urban middle class. The rural 
people, overwhelming poor, constitute the majority in the country, and some of them 
sold their votes to politicians. According to Callahan (2005), there are many kinds of 
vote buying, and they are ―adapted to the new situation,‖ for instance, the practice of 
politicians paying in cash, donating to villages, and recruiting voters as party 
members (p. 102). Vote buying is a serious problem in Thai politics. It has resulted 
from the ―socio-economic gap between urban and rural sectors‖ (Laothammatas as 
cited in Callahan, 2005, p. 107). It takes the form of patron and client relationships 
between rural voters and politicians. Voters consider politicians who buy votes as 
―good people,‖ because voters are ―acting morally within the existing social norm‖ 
(Laothammatas as cited in Callahan, 2005, p. 106). Candidates are supported by rural 
leaders who are ―local worthies‖; therefore, voters ―give their votes as a ‗favour‘ to 
candidates‖ (Laothammatas as cited in Callahan, 2005, p. 107). The votes of rural 
voters account for ―90 percent‖ of seats in parliament (Laothammatas as cited in 
Callahan, 2005, p. 106) even though they are barely two-thirds of the overall 
population. According to the Thai Constitution of 2007, in the 2011 election, the 500 
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elected members of parliament included 375 people from the direct election (Bangkok 
has 33 members of parliament, whereas all provinces throughout the country have 342 
members) and 125 people from the party list (―Election,‖ 2011). On the other hand, it 
is harder for politicians to buy votes from the middle class. In addition, the middle 
class has traditionally taken an active role in protecting what it sees as the national 
interests, monitoring and overthrowing corrupt governments (Laothammatas as cited 
in Callahan, 2005; Connors & Hewison, 2008), as during the earlier uprisings against 
military rule. However, Hewison (2010) argues that the middle class simply opposes 
the participation of the poor in political matters due to their negative views of the 
rural voters as ―ignorant, uneducated, and easily bought‖ (p. 127). 
Juridical roles. 
After the coup, the military formed an interim government. The TRT was 
dissolved by the Constitutional Court because the party had engaged in the April 2006 
electoral fraud (Ockey, 2008, p. 21). However, the TRT established the People‘s 
Power Party (PPP) serving as a ―TRT proxy party‖ (Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, 
p. 470). In 2007, the interim government held an election. The PPP won the election 
with 233 seats of the 480 seats in parliament (The Nation as cited in Ockey, 2008, p. 
24; ―The Thai,‖ 2006).  
The PPP formed a coalition government with other five parties. The DP was 
only one opposition party. The government had 315 out of 480 parliament seats, 
whereas the opposition party had 165 seats (The Nation as cited in Ockey, 2008, p. 
24). The PPP leader, Samak Sundaravej, became the prime minister. The government 
planned to amend the constitution in order to save one of PPP‘s executives from being 
charged with the 2007 electoral fraud. As a result, the PAD returned to protest against 
the pro-Thaksin government (Prasirtsuk, 2009, p. 176). However, some scholars 
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disagreed with the PAD‘s protests as simply being a failure to respect the majority 
vote which brought to power an legitimately elected government (Kitirianglarp & 
Hewison, 2009, p. 470; Thongchai as cited in Hewison, 2010, p. 125).    
The PAD successfully pressured the government and the society. According to 
Prasirtsuk (2009), protestors occupied the streets, took over the Government House, 
blocked the parliament, and seized Bangkok‘s domestic and international airports. 
The government could not dissolve the protests. At that time, the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court had crucial roles in resolving the conflict. The term of Prime 
Minister Samak was terminated by the judgment of the Constitutional Court, because 
a Thai prime minister cannot be an employee of a company and he was found to be 
operating a cooking program on television from which he earned income, and thereby 
considered an employee of the television station. As a result, his term was terminated 
because he violated the constitution. In another case, the Supreme Court judged one 
of PPP‘s executives guilty of violating the law for buying votes. Therefore, the 
Constitutional Court dissolved the PPP. All PPP‘s executives were prohibited from 
political activities for five years. Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat was among 
them; therefore, his term was terminated (Prasirtsuk, 2009, pp. 179-181).  
According to Hewison (2010), since the 2006 coup, the judiciary had 
expanded its use of power. The courts intervened in what was a political conflict, 
which ―can lead to charges of political bias,‖ amounting to a ―judicial coup‖ 
(Hewison, 2010, p. 130). Hewison‘s dismissal of the Thai judiciary system, however, 
ignores the fact that it was also willing to rule in favor of Thaksin when challenged in 
Constitutional Court, such as the 2001 ruling, following charges that he failed to 
disclose all his assets by hiding some assets in his driver and housemaid‘s names, in 
his favor. (―Likenesses,‖ 2011).    
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The uprising of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship.  
After the dissolving of the PPP in December 2008, the DP formed a coalition 
government by getting support from the military. Abhisit Vejjajiva became the prime 
minister (Chambers, 2010, p. 842; Charoensinolarn, 2010, p. 303; Kitirianglarp & 
Hewison, 2009, p. 470). This situation showed that the military had ―influence in Thai 
politics‖ (Chambers, 2010, p. 835). A third-generation pro-Thaksin party, Pheu Thai 
Party (PTP, or For Thais Party) was established, and it became an opposition party. 
This situation led to a new protest of the pro ex-Prime Minister Thaksin group, the 
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD) in early 2009. 
The UDD is ―characterized as left-wing, even radical‖ (Dalpino, 2010, p, 259). 
According to Panitan Wattanayogorn, a former government spokesman, the UDD 
comprises three groups. The first group he labeled ―spotlights,‖ and they ―sought out 
the limelight‖ (as cited in ―Wikileaks,‖ 2011, para. 4). They give financial support to 
the UDD. The second group is ―foot soldiers‖ (as cited in ―Wikileaks,‖ 2011, para. 5). 
They were the groups of frontline protestors. These groups were established in rural 
areas. Each group was independent from one another. The third group consists of 
intellectuals and scholars. Some of them are the Octobrists. This group is the brain of 
the UDD (as cited in ―Wikileaks,‖ 2011, para. 8). The second group comprises the 
majority of the UDD. They are the poor, from the north and northeast regions. Almost 
80 percent of those from the northeastern region are farmers (Dalpino, 2010, p. 259; 
Macan-Markar, 2010b). In the past, the government had not given much attention to 
the poor. However, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin responded to their demands and made 
them aware of their economic and political rights (Connor & Hewison, 2008, p. 4; 
Hewison, 2010). Furthermore, the UDD publicized the poor‘s concerns (Dalpino, 
2010, p. 262).           
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According to Prasirtsuk (2010), the UDD argued that the 2006 coup was done 
in violation of the constitution. In addition, the two courts were used as a political tool 
in order to dissolve the TRT and the PPP. Therefore, the UDD wanted ex-Prime 
Minister Thaksin to ―return home without guilt‖ (Prasirtsuk, 2010, p. 203). It 
protested against the Abhisit government and wanted the government to hold an 
election immediately (Dalpino, 2010, p. 262). The UDD rioted in Bangkok and 
Pattaya, where the 2009 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit 
was organized. ASEAN leaders had to flee, and the meeting was canceled (Prasirtsuk, 
2010, pp. 204-205). However, the government ended the chaos after a brief period 
due to the UDD‘s lack of support. According to Charoensinolarn (2010), after the 
2009 riots, ―the political divide remained real and intense‖ (p. 314). The UDD 
organized political rallies in the northern and northeastern regions, in order to gain 
grassroots support from the rural poor. The government members could not travel to 
the northern and northeastern regions. The pro-Thaksin group could not visit the 
southern region where the DP base is (Charoensinolarn, 2010; Prasirtsuk, 2010).  
In early 2010, the UDD returned to protest against the government. The 
protests began right after the Supreme Court seized $1.4 out of the $2.2 billion of the 
ex-Prime Minister Thaksin‘s assets which were frozen after the coup (Dalpino, 2011, 
p. 156; Mydans & Fuller, 2010, para. 1). There were hundreds of thousands of 
protestors (Thirasoontrakul, 2010) and ―[t]his [was] the biggest rally by rural people 
who [came] to Bangkok making demands on national political issues‖ (Aphornsuvan 
as cited in Macan-Markar, 2010b, para. 13). However, Pittaway (2010) believed some 
protestors were hired for good rates at $70 to $240 a head if they brought a vehicle (p. 
30). The ex-Prime Minister Thaksin funded them, and they were ―very well paid‖ for 
rural Thais (Pittaway, 2010, p. 30). Walker and Farrelly (2010) called some rural 
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Thais, ―Thaksin‘s crown-for-hire‖ (para. 14). The UDD‘s security guards were paid 
about $30 a day, and $60,000 was spent on daily security operations (Ruangdit, 2010, 
para. 17). Although a few sources mentioned that some of the protestors were hired, 
the UDD absolutely refused to address this issue. Therefore, these scholars might 
have pessimistic views of the UDD, but these scholars will have to furnish more 
evidence to support their arguments.  
The UDD pressured the government by occupying main streets in Bangkok, 
splashing ―hundreds of gallons of blood‖ on Prime Minister Abhisit‘s house 
(Pittaway, 2010, p. 29) and the parliament (Pittaway, 2010, p. 30), taking over the 
Ratchaprasong area—Bangkok‘s business center (Dalpino, 2011, p. 156), intruding 
into the Chulalongkorn Hospital (Dalpino, 2010, p. 261), and inciting riots 
(Pinprateep as cited in ―Poldej,‖ 2010; Pittaway, 2010; ―Suthep,‖ n.d.). As Pittaway 
(2010) asserted, ―the Red Shirts were not there to make friends or negotiate; their list 
of demands would be met or they would have to be forcibly removed‖ (p. 29). 
Furthermore, Chambers (2010) explained, the UDD was aided by a fragmented 
military which supported ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. They were called ―watermelon‖ 
soldiers—outside they wore an army green uniform, but inside they supported the Red 
Shirts (Chambers, 2010, p. 843). This demonstrated disunity in the military. However, 
Winichakul argued that some media, scholars, and civil society groups had a negative 
view on the UDD; therefore, the public had double standards for the PAD and the 
UDD. In addition, Chulalongkorn Hospital might take sides, favoring the PAD (as 
cited in ―Poldej,‖ 2010). 
The Bangkok middle class were frustrated with the UDD (Dalpino, 2011, p. 
157; River, 2010). Therefore, they gathered in groups, such as the ―Multicolor Shirts‖ 
(River, 2010, para. 6). The Multicolor Shirts argued that the UDD instigated violence 
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and riots in Bangkok and other provinces. They protested against the UDD and asked 
the UDD to end the protests. As River (2010) explained, ―they [Multicolor Shirts 
were] not pro- or anti-government, they simply [wanted] the government to shut down 
the reds [UDD] to end the violence and interruptions to daily life‖ (para. 6). There 
were strong pressures from Bangkok‘s middle class to the UDD. Consequently, the 
government decided to dissolve the protests. Finally, in May 2010, the UDD leaders 
dissolved the protests. However, some people believed that ―defiant protesters‖—
UDD‘s hardcore group—still created severe riots (Reuters as cited in ―Curfew,‖ 2010, 
para. 18). As Dalpino (2010) believed, they burnt 39 buildings, including the stock 
exchange, banks, and the Central World department store, ―which was linked to 
business families that had allied themselves against, or fallen out with, the former 
Prime Minister Thaksin‖ (p. 258). However, the UDD denied that they burnt these 
buildings. The protests ended, but the government could not transform the conflict 
and build peace in the society. This is only ―the fragile peace of the post-
Ratchaprasong period‖ (Dalpino, 2010, p. 262). 
The shift in power. 
In early 2011, Prime Minister Abhisit dissolved the parliament in order to 
organize an election. The election took place in July 2011. There was much 
competition between two major parties, the DP and the PTP (―A Surprising,‖ 2010). 
The DP nominated Abhisit, forty-six years old, as a prime minister candidate, whereas 
the PTP nominated Yingluck Shinawatra, forty-three years old, the youngest sister of 
ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. Yingluck said that ―running for the premiership was her 
way of ‗giving back to the country‘‖ (Hookway, 2011, para. 5). In addition, she 
asserted, if she became prime minister, she would resolve conflict, not continue 
revenge (―Not Revenge,‖ 2011, para. 1).  
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The major campaign issue of many parties were reconciliation and creating 
unity in Thai society. The DP‘s reconciliation model was based on the rule of law. 
The party disagreed with giving amnesty to ex-Prime Minister Thaksin (Leekpai as 
cited in Thairath Online, 2011a; Vejjajiva as cited in Political Team, 2011b). The PTP 
confirmed that its reconciliation model did not grant amnesty to ex-Prime Minister 
Thaksin (Shinawatra as cited in Thairath Online, 2011b). However, Prime Minister 
Abhisit argued that the PTP launched ―Thaksin Thinks, For Thais [PTP] Acts‖ as an 
election campaign; therefore, it was clear that the PTP and ex-Prime Minister Thaksin 
have a close relationship (Vejjajiva as cited in Political Team, 2011a, para. 1). Other 
parties also proposed reconciliation in their campaigns. For example, the Chart Thai 
Pattana Party (CP, or Thai Nation Development) used a ―reconciliation bike‖ which 
was a ―pink bicycle-like vehicle operated by seven people as a symbol of unity‖ 
(Raksaseri & Panyaarvudh, 2011, para. 7). The reconciliation bike was similar to a 
conference bike. Seven riders had to have unity in order to control the bicycle so it 
moved in one direction. 
However, the PAD appealed to the public to ―vote no,‖ because the PAD was 
upset about the Thai political scene (Leenabanchong & Pharanawalai, 2011, para. 1; 
Wirawan, 2011, para. 6), and was frustrated by the DP government and the PTP. The 
PAD used animal pictures, including a dog, buffalo, monkey, tiger, and water monitor 
lizard, to represent Thai politicians who argue excessively, are controlled by superior 
powers, are undisciplined, are cruel, and are dishonest, respectively (Phuaphongphan, 
2011, para. 8). The PAD claimed the public does not vote for any politician because 
their characteristics are similar to these five animals. On the other hand, the Thai 
Election Commission considered that these ―vote no‖ signs violated election law 
because these signs were indecent (ASTV Manager Online, 2011b, para. 2; 
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―President,‖ 2011, para. 1). However, the PAD disagreed with the Election 
Commission and appealed this issue to a court (―People‘s,‖ 2011). 
The PTP won the 2011 election by acquiring 265 out of 500 of the parliament 
seats, while the DP was the second rank, with the latter acquiring 159 seats (Election 
Commission as cited in ―Election Results,‖ 2011). Yingluck is the first Thai female 
prime minister. She used to be an executive of Shinawatra‘s companies. She did not 
have political experience. She spent 49 days on the election campaign period and 
became a prime minister (Lifestyle Online Team, 2011; Petty, 2011). Her election is 
clear proof that ex-Prime Minister Thaksin still has significant influence on Thai 
politics and the poor. 
The Yingluck government declared its policies to the parliament, announcing 
that reconciliation is an urgent policy that the government will implement in the first 
year. This policy has been continually implemented since the Abhisit administration. 
This study will discuss the two governments‘ reconciliation policies in Chapter IV.       
Conflict Transformation and Peace Building Theories 
Conflict transformation and peace building are new issues for Thai society, 
because the society had never been divided into two sides like this in the past (C. 
Satha-Anand, personal communication, September 8, 2011). According to previous 
literature, scholars did not propose how to transform the current Thai political conflict 
in order to build peace in the society. Therefore, this study explored these issues by 
investigating peace and conflict theories. 
According to Mitchell, ―conflict is a relationship between two or more parties 
… who have, or think they have, incompatible goals‖ (as cited in Fisher et al., 2000, 
p. 4). Normally, conflict is creative and resolved without violence. When conflict 
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takes place we should solve it in positive ways, or nonviolently, including conflict 
resolution and transformation (Fisher et al., 2000). 
Still, there is violence among human beings and other creatures. Some, such as 
Benjamin (2004), argue that ―violence is a product of nature‖ (p. 236). People 
compete against each other to acquire limited resources, wealth, and power. When a 
conflict takes place, it can lead to the use of violence. As Galtung noted, there are 
three types of violence including ―cultural, structural, and direct violence‖ (as cited in 
Pilisuk & Rountree, 2008, p. 49). Normally, dominant groups use violence to 
maintain their power, whereas subordinate groups use violence to acquire well-being 
and justice (Pilisuk & Rountree, 2008, p. 49). The use of violence affects people 
physically and psychologically (Johansen, 2009, p. 144). 
Nonviolence is a social product. People are concerned about the results of 
using violence; therefore, people use nonviolence instead. As Johansen (2009) 
explained, the use of violence will result in ―counter-violence‖ (p. 144). However, 
Johansen (2009) argued, ―[i]t is not obvious that all nonviolent means will always 
result in nonviolent ends‖ (p, 144). Gandhi (1996) advocated ―ahimsa‖ which means 
―the largest love, the greatest charity‖ (p. 40). Therefore, if people follow ahimsa, 
they can love their enemy. In addition, Gandhi (1996) explained the meaning of ―non-
violence‖ (p. 41) as follows: 
When a person claims to be non-violent, he is expected not to be angry 
with one who has injured him. He will not wish him harm; he will 
wish him well; he will not swear at him; he will not cause him any 
physical hurt…. Complete non-violence is complete absence of ill will 
against all that lives. (p. 41) 
  
According to King (n.d.), there are four steps of a nonviolent movement, 
including ―collection of the facts to determine whether injustices exist; negotiation; 
selfpurification; and direct action‖ (para. 6). King used nonviolent means to fight for 
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African American rights and justice. King and African Americans in Birmingham, 
Alabama, practiced nonviolent actions confident that they would not retaliate when 
they were attacked. In addition, they were ready to accept punishment from an 
authority (King, n.d.). 
According to Satha-Anand (1999), in the past two decades, Thai society 
successfully used nonviolent movements to topple a military government. In 1992, 
Chamlong Srimuang, ―a former military commander and Bangkok governor‖ led the 
Bangkok middle class to practice nonviolent movements in order to oust Prime 
Minister General Suchinda Kraprayoon from office (Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 159). 
They followed the ―19 Secretes of Nonviolence‖ (Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 159). For 
example, the use of nonviolence prevented them from ―the vicious cycle of violence‖ 
(Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 160). Nonviolence will affect enemy‘s minds to overcome 
their ―narrow-mindedness, love of power, and greed‖ (Satha-Anand, 1999, p. 159). 
However, nonviolence might not protect protestors from suppression. In addition, if 
protestors use both nonviolence and violence, this destroys nonviolent legitimacy 
(Satha-Anand, 1999).  
According to Satha-Anand (1999) and Schock (2005), the 1992 nonviolent 
movements acquired support from nongovernment organizations, university student 
organizations, the middle class, and some capitalists. The protests began with a 
hunger strike by Chalad Vorachat in April 1992. This situation influenced large 
numbers of the Bangkok middle class to protest against the government. They 
followed nonviolent movements led by Chamlong. Soldiers were sent in to control 
and finally suppress unarmed protestors. When violence broke out, the soldiers 
dissolved the protests. The soldiers shot at protestors who attacked them, but not 
protestors who practiced nonviolence. However, the protestors soon returned and 
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regrouped. Even though the government censored the media, the middle class used 
communication technologies, such as cellular phones, fax machines, and email, to 
contact their networks, families, and to spread information among them and the 
public. The government could not control these modern communication networks. 
Moreover, other nonviolent means were used to pressure the government. For 
example, people withdrew money from the Thai Military Bank, doctors refused to 
treat injured soldiers, and professors refused to lecture at military institutes. There was 
high pressure from the society; therefore, the pro-military prime minister resigned. 
This case has illustrated how a nonviolent campaign overcame suppression by the 
government. The use of violence destroyed the legitimacy of the government (Satha-
Anand, 1999; Schock, 2005).         
In the current political conflict, the parties in conflict, including the PAD, the 
UDD, and the government argued that they used nonviolence (Satha-Anand, 2010). 
The PAD and the UDD believed that occupying commercial areas, seizing the 
Government House and airports, and splashing blood were nonviolent means. 
However, they denied creating the riots. The understandings of the PAD and the UDD 
of nonviolence might deviate from academic concepts like those of Gandhi and King 
(Thedmongthai, 2010), and the 1992 nonviolent resistances. The government argued 
that it carefully managed to end the protests. In addition, the military has learned from 
the 1992 conflict that the public and protestors do not accept the use of violence 
against unarmed demonstrators by the army. However, violence still took place, for 
example, in the clashes between protestors and officers in October 2008 and April 
2011, as well as in dissolving the protests in May 2011.  
Fisher et al. (2000) explained conflict resolution and transformation processes. 
Conflict resolution addresses the causes of conflict in order to end conflict and 
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violence between opposing parties. It aims to create compatible goals between 
conflicting parties. Conflict transformation addresses wider aspects of conflict, such 
as social and political causes. It aims to transform the negative energy in a conflict 
into positive and sustainable changes (Fisher et al., 2000, pp. 7-8). 
Lederach (2003a) explained the meanings of conflict resolution, conflict 
management, and conflict transformation. People always perceive that conflict is bad 
and want to resolve it. However, we never resolve conflict and it still exists. In 
addition, we cannot manage conflict because it is difficult to predict and regulate. 
However, people can transform conflict, which means ―we do not eliminate or 
control, but we do impact the path of conflict‖ (Lederach, 2003a, p. 90). We can 
transform both our ―perceptions‖ and our ―expressions‖ of conflict (Lederach, 2003a, 
p. 90).      
According to Coy (2009), conflicting parties should perceive conflict in 
positive ways. Positive conflict creates social and political changes (Coy, 2009, p. 
63). In addition, conflict does not have a single dimension, but it relates to many 
problems. For example, social conflicts relate to ―‗violence,‘ ‗injustice,‘ ‗disrespect,‘ 
‗oppression,‘ and ‗inequality‘‖ (Coy, 2009, p. 64). The heart of conflict resolution is 
negotiation, which is based on ―interest-based bargaining‖ (Coy, 2009, p. 64). It is 
impossible to resolve conflict without negotiations. For example, the Abhisit 
government and the UDD leaders negotiated with each other twice. The prime 
minister agreed to dissolve the parliament, if the UDD dissolved the protests. The 
UDD leaders almost accepted the government‘s proposal. However, some UDD 
protestors did not accept. Therefore, the protests continued and violence took place. 
The UDD rioted in Bangkok, its vicinities, and in the north and northeastern 
provinces. Bangkok‘s middle class, such as the Multicolor Shirts, were upset by the 
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UDD; therefore, they protested against the UDD and wanted the government to 
dissolve the UDD protests. Finally, the government decided to do that. Even though 
the government claimed that it carefully managed its attempt to end the protests, in 
some tense situations violence broke out. In conflicts related to ―multiple problems‖ 
(Coy, 2009, p. 64), we need conflict transformation, which focuses on the roots of 
social conflicts and the changing of fundamental arrangements. Finally, peace 
building aims to mobilize a conflicted society to acquire ―positive peace,‖ which 
focuses on ending direct, structural, and cultural violence (Coy, 2009, p. 69). 
According to Miall (2004), there are five types of conflict transformations, 
which include context, structural, actor, issue, and personal transformations (pp. 9-
10). Three types may relate to the Thai political conflict, including structural, issue, 
and personal transformations. Structural transformations aim to change the structure 
of conflicts, and create compatible goals and relationships. For example, two groups, 
including ―non-electoral democratic powers‖ and ―electoral democratic powers‖ have 
to adjust their power structures (Satha-Anand as cited in ―Surakiart,‖ 2011, para. 12). 
Issue transformations aim to reform positions of conflicting parties in relation to the 
conflict issues. For example, the PAD pursued the rule of law against vote buying and 
corruption, whereas the UDD asked the society to respect the majority vote (Tejapira 
as cited in ―The War,‖ 2010). These two issues are important for democracy. 
However, they are separated in Thai society. Therefore, the conflicting parties have to 
integrate both issues. Lastly, personal transformations aim to change the perspectives, 
heart, and will of a person. For example, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin has changed his 
perspective on his conflicting parties. He realized that he exercised hard power when 
he was in office. Therefore, he apologized to his conflicting parties and to the public 
(Traisuriyathanma, 2011). 
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According to Sarkin (1999), the conflict transformation of South Africa was a 
successful story. The country could overcome its previous wounds, such as human 
rights violations and ethnic divisions, of the apartheid regime. The Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) played a crucial role to remedy the nation‘s 
wounds. The TRC allowed victims to reveal their cruel truths, or ―truth-telling,‖ 
(Sarkin, 1999, para. 7) of the past conflict to the public. At the same time, reparation 
and rehabilitation were implemented to heal the victims. In addition, the TRC had 
authority to ―grant amnesty where appropriate‖ (Sarkin as cited in Sarkin, 1999, para. 
10). The South African model could be applied to Thai society. 
According to Bar-on (2006), conflicting parties always blame each other as 
wrongdoers; therefore, conflict transformation does not take place. In contrast, Bar-on 
(2006) proposed ―self-criticism‖ (p. 153) which asks conflicting parties to critique 
themselves rather than blame the other side for wrongdoing. For example, Bar-on 
(2006) asked Israel and Palestine to revise their narratives instead of discrediting the 
other‘s narrative. This may apply to the Thai political conflict. Conflicting parties 
have to critique themselves and aim to transform the conflicts. For example, ex-Prime 
Minister Thaksin admitted that he made mistakes. He had used hard power and had 
not considered some people‘s feelings; therefore, conflicts took place 
(Traisuriyathanma, 2011). Self-criticism makes conflicting parties recognize and 
address their mistakes. This may create an open atmosphere in Thai society and 
facilitate conflict transformation and peace building. 
Reconciliation deals with ―three specific paradoxes‖ (Lederach, 2003b, p. 40).  
First, it provides a place for conflicting parties to share their perceptions, feelings, and 
experiences with one another. This aims to create new perceptions and experiences. 
Second, reconciliation deals with the truth and mercy. Conflicting parties will expose 
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truth and renew relationships. Third, it relates to justice and peace by redressing 
wrongs and creating a connected future (Lederach, 2003b, p. 40).   
Current Reconciliation Ideologies in Thai Society 
Before the 2011 election, Prawase Wasi, the chair of the National Reform 
Assembly of Thailand (NRA), proposed some solutions to transform the conflict. 
First, if the PTP gained power, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin would interfere with the 
government. Therefore, Wasi argued that the ex-prime minister should adjust his roles 
and refrain from doing things that people will not like. Second, the society has to 
learn to live together peacefully. Some Thais have to adjust their ways of thinking. 
Thais must not think of dichotomy or divisiveness. Conflicting parties always think 
that their side is right, and the other side is wrong. If the other side does not think as 
we do, they are wrong. Then, Thais fight against each other. These kinds of thoughts 
contrast with Buddhist and scientific principles, in which the nature of things is 
flexible and related. Therefore, ruling and opposition parties have to cooperate rather 
than fight against the other side. The media should not divide people and the society. 
Third, political movements have to be executed in positive and nonviolent ways. 
Positive political movements will facilitate policy changes, such as reforming power 
structure, land reform, tax reform, narrowing development gaps, and eradicating 
socioeconomic inequality. In addition, Thais have to have common goals, because 
some Thais never share common goals together. Some are always divided and narrow 
minded. Therefore, Thais have to change their ways of thinking and commit to public 
interests rather than private interests. Then the nation will successfully transform the 
conflict (Wasi as cited in ―Unlock,‖ 2011).  
Surakiart Sathirathai, a former deputy prime minister of the Thaksin 
administration, and Chaiwat Satha-Anand are members of the advisory team of the 
33 
 
 
Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand (TRCT). Before joining the 
advisory team, they proposed reconciliation guidelines to the public. According to 
Satha-Anand, Thai society is considering two reconciliation models: truth seeking and 
the rule of law, and forgiving, forgetting, and amnesty. Each model leads to different 
results and costs to the society (as cited in ―Surakiart,‖ 2011).  
In addition, Satha-Anand explained, reconciliation relates to both non-
electoral democratic powers, and electoral democratic powers. These two powers 
have to compromise with each other. Political parties are the electoral democratic 
power. Ruling and opposition parties could cooperate with the other side because they 
share common interests and rely on each other. However, many organizations in the 
society represent non-electoral democratic powers, such as the media and business 
sectors. They also have influence on politics. An important question is how to make 
the non-electoral democratic powers accept the reconciliation of political parties 
(Satha-Anand as cited in ―Surakiart,‖ 2011). According to Sathirathai, conflicting 
parties have fought against each other for six years. Thai society loses and suffers, but 
the conflict still exists. Therefore, reconciliation is a right choice for the society. The 
TRCT is an independent body. It is an appropriate agency to execute reconciliation. 
The TRCT is accepted by all conflicting parties. Moreover, the United Nations, 
international organizations, and ambassadors accept the TRCT (Sathirathai as cited in 
―Surakiart,‖ 2011).  
In addition, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin gave interviews to the newspaper 
Matichon and Thai Public Broadcasting Service (Thai PBS) about his reconciliation 
model. According to the article ―Thaksin‖ (2011), ex-Prime Minister Thaksin tried to 
persuade Thai society that reconciliation is easy. He compared reconciliation with the 
human interactions of hitting, talking, hugging, and kissing. He explained, when 
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people or conflicting parties are angry, they should hit sandbags in order to release 
their emotions. When they calm down, they can talk to each other in order to create 
mutual understandings. Since conflicting parties start to talk, their relationships will 
be developed. Next, they can hug each other. Finally, when all conflicts are 
transformed, conflicting parties can kiss each other (―Thaksin,‖ 2011). 
Ex-Prime Minister Thaksin further explained that reconciliation is an urgent 
task for the Yingluck government. It needs to be done with truth seeking and 
rehabilitation of victims. When truth is revealed, Thai society has to decide how to 
deal with the wrongdoers. They should be punished or given amnesty. The society has 
to answer these questions (―Thaksin,‖ 2011). 
Furthermore, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin gave an interview to Thai PBS. He 
said that he forgives all conflicting parties and wants Thailand to become a peaceful 
and united society as it was previously. He forgives the 2006 coup leader and a PAD 
leader. If the two leaders do not believe him, they can visit him in Dubai where he 
lives in exile. He will treat them to coffee. In addition, he appreciates former 
President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela, and his reconciliation model. Even 
though he had been detained for 27 years, he forgave all those responsible for his 
imprisonment and successfully built peace in South Africa. Thai society might apply 
the South African model to transform the conflict and build peace in the nation. 
Furthermore, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin mentioned apologizing to Thai society. He 
said that no man is perfect. When he was the prime minister, he was devoted to work, 
but did not consider other people‘s feelings. Moreover, he was the prime minister for 
a long time, five years, so he exercised hard power rather than soft power. Therefore, 
his actions created conflicts within Thai society. Finally, he emphasized that the 
government has to create unity and build peace in the country. Especially in 2011, this 
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is a very important year for all Thais to celebrate the king‘s 84th birthday. Therefore, 
the government has to create a united and peaceful society for this special occasion 
(Traisuriyathanma, 2011). 
Summary 
The previous literature explained causes and effects of the conflict, but the 
literature did not propose solutions. Currently, there are some initial reconciliation 
ideologies proposed in Thai society. However, the conflict still exists and people have 
divided because they perceive conflict in negative ways. Therefore, conflict 
reconciliation is needed in order to transform the conflict and build peace in the 
country. This research is significant, because it may provide guidelines for Thai 
society to transform the current conflict and build peace in the nation. 
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CHAPTER III  
STATEMENT OF THE THESIS 
Research Design 
This is a qualitative research study that aims to understand the current Thai 
political conflict. The study used a triangulation of methods to support the validity 
and reliability of the research (Patton as cited in Golafshani, 2003). Triangulation 
included policy analysis, content analysis, and interviews. This study aimed to answer 
the research question: How to transform the current Thai political conflict and build 
peace in Thai society?  
Policy Analysis 
Government policies. 
This research explored two Thai government policies, or Policy Statements of 
the Council of Ministers, including the Abhisit and Yingluck government policies, in 
order to understand the positions of the government policies in relation to the political 
conflict. The study examined the two government policies because this research was 
conducted during the two administrations. The researcher began this study in early 
2011. At that time, Abhisit was the prime minister. After the 2011 election, the PTP 
acquired majority votes. As a result, the power shifted from the Abhisit to the 
Yingluck government. In August 2011, Yingluck became the prime minister. 
However, the conflict was not resolved. Moreover, the Abhisit and Yingluck 
governments are from different parties. They have both common and different means 
to transform the conflict. Therefore, the study explored the two government policies 
in order to understand similarities and differences between the two government 
policies which have contributed to the current conflict.  
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Content Analysis 
The media. 
 This study investigated the influences of the media on the conflict and society. 
Bruno (2009) illustrated the influence of the media in a United States case involving 
print media in which he argued that the U.S. had a bias toward a labor organization 
which shaped people‘s attitudes toward the labor organization.  
Some Thai media share a similar situation because of the PAD‘s own media 
(Hewison, 2010; Ockey, 2007, 2009; Tejapira, 2006) as well as the UDD‘s (C. Satha-
Anand, personal communication, September 8, 2011). In addition, both groups may 
have other media support (C. Satha-Anand, personal communication, September 8, 
2011). Therefore, the research explored the media, including newspapers, radio and 
television, and social media, in order to see the media‘s influences on Thai society.   
Newspapers. 
The researcher examined Thai newspapers in order to find any newspaper 
support of one or the other conflicting parties, and how that support influences the 
public. The researcher accessed online newspapers because online media was 
convenient to access and suitable for the length of the study. According to previous 
literature, scholars pointed out that some media might take sides (ASTV Manager 
Online, 2011C; Hewison, 2010; Ockey, 2007, 2009; Tejapera, 2006; ―Why,‖ 2011). 
The researcher used these scholars‘ arguments as a starting point to examine 
newspapers. 
This study started to explore Manager Online, because scholars pointed out 
that it supports the PAD (Hewison, 2010; Ockey, 2007, 2009; Tejapera, 2006; ―Why,‖ 
2011). Manager Online is an online newspaper of the Manager group. The study 
searched Manager Online for news content related to the conflict. The researcher 
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found that the Manager group clearly stated that it takes sides (Thongthanakul as cited 
in Rojanaphruk, 2011). 
In addition, the study also investigated other online newspapers whose 
contents were related to the conflict. The online search linked topic keywords to 
online newspapers from 2008 to 2011, including Dailynews, Khaosod, Komchadluek, 
Krungthep Turakij, Matichon, The Nation, Prachachat Turakit, and Thairath.  
Radio and Television.  
The study examined Thai radio and television. The researcher randomly 
listened to and watched mainstream radio and television from July to September 
2011. Mainstream media appeared to attempt to create understanding and unity 
among Thais. Some radio and television broadcast programs addressed reconciliation 
issues explicitly, and others addressed them implicitly. On the other hand, there are 
alternative radio and television, and some of them might take sides. However, it is a 
sensitive issue to mention negative influences of the media on the society. Therefore, 
the study referred to previous literature when addressing such negative influences.  
Social Media. 
Social media was used to express information and opinions to the public. It is 
widely used among Thais, including the PAD and UDD‘s supporters, ex-Prime 
Minister Thaksin and Abhisit, and Prime Minister Yingluck to communicate with the 
public. This study explored social media while also referring to scholars‘ opinions 
toward social media. The researcher explored websites that might support the PAD 
and the UDD, and Facebook pages of ex-Prime Minister Abhisit and Prime Ministers 
Yingluck. 
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Interviews 
 The researcher conducted in-depth interviews with Thai citizens, in order to 
obtain their opinions on the conflict transformation and peace building. The study 
used four open-ended questions. The length of the interviews ranged between 25-30 
minutes per person. 
Population and sample. 
The researcher interviewed six Thais, including a respected scholar who is an 
expert in peace and conflict studies, and five average Thai citizens. Professor Satha-
Anand is a faculty member of the Political Science Department at Thammasat 
University. He is an expert in the politics of peace and conflict. Large numbers of his 
studies relate to peace and nonviolent movements. He is a well-known scholar both in 
Thailand and internationally. 
For the other five Thais, the researcher randomly requested them to participate 
in interviews. The interviews‘ topic and questions were related to political conflict; 
therefore, many people rejected interview requests because they were uncomfortable 
participating. The five interviewees were interested in political conflict and agreed to 
participate in the interviews. They had different genders, ages, backgrounds, 
occupations, and perspectives. They expressed their thoughtful opinions on the 
conflict transformation and peace building. 
Instrumentation. 
The researcher used four open-ended questions as follows: 
1. Since 2006, there have been large-scale protests by the PAD and the UDD 
in Bangkok, Thailand. Do you agree or disagree with the PAD and the UDD leaders 
organizing the protests in order to put pressure on the Thai government? 
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2. Do you agree or disagree that even though there were large-scale protests of 
the PAD and the UDD, Thai society could handle them because there were not 
massive violations, such as civil war, taking place as in some countries? 
3. Do you agree or disagree that some people might be persuaded and 
manipulated by the PAD or the UDD leaders in order to make them participate in the 
protests? 
4. During the 2011 election campaign, creating harmony in Thai society was a 
major issue proposed by many parties. Two controversial topics were should the ex-
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra be granted amnesty and pardon. What are your 
opinions about these two topics?  
Research Setting 
The research was conducted in Thailand and in the United States. Two parts of 
the research were conducted in Bangkok, Thailand, including the exploration of the 
media and the interviews. The researcher conducted this study in Bangkok because it 
is the capital city of Thailand and is directly related to the current conflict. The 2006 
coup and the large-scale protests of the PAD and the UDD took place in Bangkok. Its 
population is the most economically diverse in the country, including the middle 
class, the urban and the rural poor.    
An interview was conducted at Thammasat University with Professor Chaiwat 
Satha-Anand. The other five interviews were randomly conducted in communities of 
Bangkok that might relate to the PAD and the UDD. In order to protect privacy and 
confidentiality, the researcher did not mention specific community‘s names. The other 
parts of the research were written in the United States, at the University of San 
Francisco. 
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CHAPTER IV  
DATA AND FINDINGS 
Introduction 
 This research aimed to find out how to transform the current Thai political 
conflict and build peace in Thai society. Findings were derived from three sources, 
including the government policies, the media, and interviews. The study explored 
both the previous and the present government policies. The two governments are from 
different parties, the DP and the PTP. When the DP became the government, the PTP 
was an opposition party. Currently, the PTP is the government, while the DP is an 
opposition party. Therefore, the policy analysis will show similarities and differences 
in the two government policies. Next, the study explored the influences of the media 
on both the society and the current conflict. Some of the media are criticized as taking 
sides and having strong influences to shape people‘s attitudes. At the same time, the 
media serve to check and balance one another as well as those representing opposite 
sides. Lastly, the research compiled results of interviews with a scholar and five other 
interviewees. These interview subjects provided their opinions on the conflict and 
reconciliation issues.            
Findings 
Government Policies 
The Abhisit government policies. 
When the Abhisit government declared its policies to the parliament in 
December 2008, Thai society had been divided in two. Even though the PAD had 
already dissolved the protests, the conflict was intense. The government did not 
declare its policies at the parliament as usual, because it anticipated that the UDD 
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might protest at the parliament. Thus, the government kept the policies secret and 
immediately declared them at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (―Abhisit,‖ 2008).  
According to ―Policy‖ (2008), the government wanted to end the political 
conflict. The government organized its policies in two parts, including ―urgent 
policies to be implemented in the first year‖ (p. 3), and the other seven policies to be 
implemented gradually. Ending the political conflict was one of the urgent policies. 
The government aimed to ―heal social division and ensure for Thais a better quality of 
life, to put an end to the political crisis and undertake political reform consistent with 
the system of democratic governance with the King as Head of State‖ (p. 3). In order 
to accomplish these goals, the government committed to ―[p]romptly promote 
harmony and reconciliation among people in the nation by using peaceful means‖ (p. 
4). 
According to the urgent policy about the political conflict, two major issues 
were addressed by the government, including the political conflict and the institution 
of monarchy. First, with regard to the current conflict, Thai society has been divided 
into two opposite sides, including dichotomies between the PAD and the UDD, the 
rich and the poor, urban and rural, and authoritarian and democratic (Dalpino, 2010, 
p. 258). However, other scholars had different views from Dalpino‘s. There is not a 
conflict between the rich and the poor. However, there is a conflict between the 
middle class and the poor because the majority of the middle class support the PAD, 
whereas large numbers of the poor support the UDD (Connors & Hewison, 2008; 
Hewison, 2010). In addition, the PAD and the UDD acquire support from elites and 
have financial help (Satha-Anand, 2010, para. 5).  
Furthermore, the ideological conflict is not a conflict between authoritarian 
and democratic rules. The PAD does not favor authoritarian rule as Dalpino argued. 
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On the contrary, the PAD argued that ex-Prime Minister Thaksin was authoritarian 
because he controlled the majority of seats in the parliament and ―his political power 
became entrenched and unstoppable‖ (Pongsudhirak, 2010, para. 3). The PAD has 
fought against the money politics, corruption, and vote buying (Hewison, 2010, p. 
125). The PAD has pursued democracy under the rule of law, but the UDD has 
pursued democracy under the majority vote. The rule of law and the majority vote are 
preferable for a democratic regime. However, in the current conflict, they are 
separated and the society has to integrate them (Tejapira as cited in ―The War,‖ 2010).  
The government declared its policies to promote harmony and reconciliation 
among Thais by using peaceful means. However, violence broke out. As Satha-Anand 
asserted, the government and the UDD were committed to nonviolent means. The 
government communicated and negotiated with the UDD in order to dissolve the 
protests. In addition, almost 80 percent of the UDD‘s protests were nonviolent (Satha-
Anand as cited in Tejapira, 2011b, 2011c). However, these attempts failed because 
there were unidentified forces—Thais called them the Black Shirts—who started to 
use violence first (ASTV Manager Online, 2011a). The government and the UDD 
suspected each other of supporting the unidentified forces. For 67 days of protests, 
there were 92 deaths, including 71 protestors, 10 officers, 1 Multicolor Shirt, and 10 
innocent bystanders. Overall, the government and the UDD maintained nonviolence 
for 60 percent of the duration of the protests (Satha-Anand as cited in Tejapira, 2011b, 
2011c). However, UDD leaders countered that the UDD never used violent means nor 
created the riots and that those who created violence were fake UDD protestors who 
tried to discredit the UDD and wanted the UDD to look guilty (ASTV Manager 
Online, 2010b; Krungthep Turakij Online, 2010a, 2010b). 
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Second, the Abhisit government committed to protect the institution of 
monarchy and illustrated this edict in the following policy: 
to protect and uphold the Monarchy in its role as the centre of national 
unity and harmony among Thais, to enshrine the Monarchy in a position 
of reverence above all forms of political conflict; and to take all 
necessary measures to prevent any infringement of the royal inviolable 
position. (―Policy,‖ 2008, p. 3) 
 
Typically, the monarchic institution is neutral and above partisan and political conflict 
(―Prime Minister,‖ 2009). However, conflicting parties had tried to involve the 
institution in the political conflicts in order to defeat the other side (Tejapira, 2011a, p. 
53). For example, in 2006, the PAD could not oust the Thaksin government. 
Therefore, it called on the use of Article 7 of the Constitution, and appealed to the 
institution to appoint a government. However, the PAD‘s proposals were inappropriate 
(Connors as cited in Kitirianglarp & Hewison, 2009, pp. 468-469). In addition, when 
asked whether the PAD was acting on behalf of the institution, Princess Sirindhorn 
replied, ―I don‘t think so.... They do things for themselves‖ (AP as cited in 
Rojanaphruk, 2008, para. 3). On the other hand, when Abhisit was the opposition 
leader, he was alleged by the Thaksin government as lese majesty (―Prime Minister,‖ 
2009). However, Abhisit was proved innocent.  
According to Streckfuss, the numbers of Thai lese majesty cases have 
increased sharply. For the past 20 years, there were 5 to 6 lese majesty cases a year. 
However, the cases have dramatically increased to 126, 164, and 479 in 2007, 2009, 
and 2010, respectively (Streckfuss as cited in Citizen Journalism, 2011). Evidence 
shows that conflicting parties have tried to involve the institution in the conflict. 
However, the institution is above politics and Thais revere the institution (―Prime 
Minister,‖ 2009). Therefore, the government wanted to protect and uphold the 
institution from infringement.  
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In order to transform the conflict, the Abhisit government appointed three 
independent bodies, including the National Reform Committee (NRC), the National 
Reform Assembly (NRA), and the Truth for Reconciliation Commission of Thailand 
(TRCT) (―Abhisit Prepares,‖ 2011; Ashayaqachat, 2010; Daplino, 2010, p. 262). The 
NRC aims to create ―reform strategies‖ for the country, and the NRA focuses on 
―public participation‖ in the reconciliation and reforming processes (Online 
Reporters, 2010, para. 4). Both share common objectives which aim to reduce social 
inequality and create unity in Thailand (Admin, 2010a, 2010b; Dalpino, 2010, p. 262). 
According to Kanit Na-Nakorn, the chair of the TRCT, the TRCT aims to find the 
roots and truth of the conflict, rather than find wrongdoers and punish them, because 
punishment is negative justice. Negative justice cannot resolve the conflict. The 
TRCT is committed to positive justice, including truth seeking, reconciliation, and 
rehabilitation, which facilitates conflict transformation and prevents a new conflict 
(Na-Nakorn as cited in ―Introduce,‖ n.d.). 
  The members of the three independent bodies are notable figures in Thai 
society, and they represent the various groups in Thailand. The chair of the NRC is a 
former Thai Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun, who served from 1991 to 1992. The 
chair of the NRA is Prawase Wasi, a respected senior Thai citizen who has worked in 
the social sector his whole life. The total members of the NRC and the NRA are 20 
and 28 people, respectively. They are respected scholars, human rights activists, 
political activists, social activists, NGOs, economists, entrepreneurs, officers, and a 
priest. The chair of the TRCT is Kanit Na-Nakorn, who once served in various 
important positions, such as attorney general and vice leader of the TRT; he was also 
a respected scholar. The TRCT consists of eight people, including respected scholars, 
human rights activists, a senior newspaper editor, and an officer (Admin, 2010a, 
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2010b; ASTV Manager Online, 2010a; ―Introduce,‖ n.d.). In addition, the TRCT 
already visited all conflicting parties in order to listen to their demands, and has been 
accepted by all the parties involved (Sathirathai as cited in ―Surakiart,‖ 2011).      
The first two independent bodies, the NRC and the NRA, and the TRCT have 
three and two years to complete their missions, respectively (Chanrotchanakit, 2011; 
―Three Years,‖ 2010). They did not complete their work in the Abhisit administration. 
Therefore, the results of conflict reconciliation have not yet taken place. However, the 
Yingluck government acknowledges these three independent bodies and has not 
intervened or changed their members. The three independent bodies have continued 
their work to transform the conflict, and will submit their proposals to the 
government. Therefore, the Yingluck government is playing a major role in 
transforming the conflict and building peace in the nation.   
The Yingluck government policies. 
  When the PTP assumed power, there was no protest and the degree of current 
conflict had been reduced. However, the conflict is not resolved yet. In August 2011, 
the Yingluck administration delivered its policies to the parliament, declaring 
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and truth seeking as urgent policies (―Policy,‖ 2011). 
The government is continuing these policies from the Abhisit administration. The 
government especially encourages the three independent bodies, the NRC, the NRA, 
and the TRCT, which were established by the Abhisit government to continue their 
work (Traisuriyathanma, 2011). In September 2011, the TRCT invited six peace and 
conflict experts to be its advisory team. Professor Satha-Anand, who allowed this 
researcher to interview him, is one of the experts on this team. In addition, the TRCT 
plans to invite Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, 
Ricardo Lagos, former President of Chile, and Martti Ahtisaari, former President of 
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Finland, to join the advisory team (―TRCT,‖ 2011). Thai society does not have rich 
experience in conflict transformation; therefore, the TRCT wants the advisory team to 
share its experience with the TRCT. 
 However, evidence shows that transforming the conflict and building peace in 
the country are not easy. First, since the PTP assumed power, the UDD cannot settle 
its appropriate roles yet. It still creates movements in order to show that the 
government has much support from the people, and it is ready to protect the 
government from opposition. When the government declared the policies to the 
parliament, some UDD supporters gathered and encouraged the government in front 
of the parliament. They charged two people who brought a wreath to the parliament 
(―Red Shirts,‖ 2011). Furthermore, UDD supporters upset a female television reporter 
who had asked questions that made the prime minister feel uncomfortable. The 
supporters sent email to intimidate her and other media outlets. They wanted her 
office to punish her (ASTV Manager Online, 2011d; Krungthep Turakij Online, 2011). 
 Second, it is clear that the PTP supports ex-Prime Minister Thaksin because it 
launched an election campaign ―Thaksin Thinks, For Thais [PTP] Acts.‖ In addition, 
Prime Minister Yingluck accepted that she ―[cloned]‖ her brother, ex-Prime Minister 
Thaksin (―Yingluck Accepts,‖ 2011, para. 3). Therefore, the public is now 
questioning the Yingluck government‘s intentions to remove ex-Prime Minister 
Thaksin from guilt. The government denies any such intentions. However, since the 
PTP won the election and formed the government, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin could 
visit Germany and Japan. Despite the fact that the ex-prime minister is guilty by 
judgment of the Supreme Court, he still lives in exile and has not yet been punished. 
The government has issued an arrest warrant for him and, as a result, some countries 
that have legal agreements with Thailand do not allow him to visit. With regard to 
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visiting Japan, the Thai government said a Japanese business group invited the ex-
prime minister to Japan and the Japanese government granted a temporary visa for 
him. The Thai government does not have the authority to request the Japanese 
government to grant a temporary visa (―Japan,‖ 2011; ―Thaksin Visited,‖ 2011; 
―Yingluck,‖ 2011).  
In another case, a deputy prime minister seemed to facilitate royal pardon 
procedures for ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. The deputy prime minister argues that 
more than 3 million signature requests were submitted to the Abhisit government two 
years ago (Rainangpised, 2011). He will follow up on this case. However, this is a 
sensitive and controversial issue. Some argued that a person who requests a royal 
pardon must be punished at that time. However, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin is not 
punished because he has lived in exile for six years. Therefore, he does not have the 
right to request a royal pardon. If the government wants to pursue this issue against 
the rule of law, a new conflict could occur (―Abhisit Does,‖ 2011; ASTV Manager 
Online, 2011e; ―Sanan,‖ 2011) and may lead the PAD to protests (―Prinya,‖ 2011). 
Regarding this controversial issue, Prime Minister Yingluck affirmed that requesting 
the royal pardon is not the government policy and it is not urgent work. The 
government considers national reconciliation as its first priority, and it will not serve 
only one person‘s demand, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin (ASTV Manager Online, 
2011f; Rainangpised, 2011; ―Requesting,‖ 2011). It is clear that there is resistance 
from the public about requesting the royal pardon. Therefore, the government has to 
handle this issue properly and carefully in order to avoid further conflict. 
Apart from the reconciliation policy, populist policy is another urgent policy. 
The policy largely supported the PTP to win the election. The government asserts that 
populist policy will benefit the poor and narrow development gaps, which is a cause 
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of the current conflict. At present, Thai society pays attention to two populist policies, 
including to ―[e]nable a worker to earn not less than 300 Baht [10 Dollars] per day 
and a bachelor‘s degree holder to have an income of not less than 15,000 Baht [500 
Dollars] per month‖ (―Policy,‖ 2011, pp. 6-7). People believed that workers will earn 
300 Baht throughout the country, which has 77 provinces, and bachelor‘s degree 
holders will earn salaries of 15,000 Baht. However, the government declared that in 
the first phase, workers in 7 provinces will receive 300 Baht. The rest of the 70 
provinces have to wait for the second phase (―Seven,‖ 2011). For the latter policy, 
government officers who hold a bachelor‘s degree will receive salaries and 
compensation for 15,000 Baht. The government cannot increase salaries to 15,000 
Baht because this will affect the salary system, such as pensions. Therefore, the 
government will give compensation instead. This policy needs time, approximately 
four years, to increase salaries to 15,000 Baht. In addition, the policy is not enforced 
in the private sector (Maihadsibanyen, 2011). The government has to prove that it is 
committed to eradicating social inequality as promised.                  
The Media 
The media have played crucial roles in the public during the past six years. 
Some media that have been criticized as taking sides were the PAD and the UDD 
(Hewison, 2010; ―ICT,‖ 2010; Kwanchai as cited in Macan-Markar, 2010a; Ockey, 
2007, 2009; Satha-Anand, 2010; Tejapira, 2006; ―Why,‖ 2011). Various media, such 
as newspapers, radio, television, and social media, have been used by conflicting 
parties in order to reach people of all ages in urban and rural areas and acquire support 
from the public.  
To avoid defamation and libel, the research posits that all information 
illustrated in this section was derived from findings. The researcher did not make any 
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assumptions. Even though some media were criticized for taking sides, this meant 
some news and content of these media might be biased; however, not all news and 
contents of these media were biased. 
Newspapers. 
This researcher acquired information by investigating newspapers and 
previous literature. In democracies, newspapers often check and balance one another. 
Therefore, the researcher acquired information by exploring several newspapers. 
According to Hewison (2010), one of the leaders of the PAD is a ―media tycoon‖ (p. 
125). He is an owner of ASTV Manager—the name of a television station and 
newspapers—(Ockey, 2007, p. 134; Tejapira, 2006, p. 5). In addition, the Matichon 
newspaper argued that the PAD has used ASTV Manager and its media networks to 
appeal people to join the protests (―Why,‖ 2011, para. 10). On the other hand, the 
Manager group asserted that Matichon was pro UDD (ASTV Manager Online, 2011c). 
The Thai senate and media associations organized a seminar about the roles 
and responsibilities of Thailand‘s media. This seminar was organized in May 2009 
after the PAD‘s protests in 2008 and the UDD‘s riots in early 2009. According to 
Thepchai Yong, the director of Thai Public Broadcasting Service, ASTV Manager and 
D-Station (the latter, a pro-UDD television station) are alternative media. They 
broadcast political activities of the PAD and the UDD throughout the country. The 
number of people who consume alternative media have increased. Alternative media 
have influenced the public. Recently, they have tried to persuade people to take sides 
and stimulate people‘s emotions to anger, love, and hatred (as cited in ASTV Manager 
Online, 2009). Therefore, Prasong Lertratanawisute, who was a former editor of 
Matichon and chair of the Thai Journalists Association, asked some media to stop 
intensifying the conflict (as cited in ASTV Manager Online, 2009).  
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In June 2011, the senate organized the same seminar and got the same result 
that the media were taking sides. As Rojanaphruk (2011) confirmed, ―[t]he Thai 
media most likely will continue to be highly politicised, biased and divided—even 
after this Sunday‘s general election [3 July 2011], a symposium on partiality and 
impartiality of media during elections has concluded‖ (para. 1). Therefore, the media 
have influenced and divided people. This situation is dangerous for the society (Yong 
as cited in ASTV Manager Online, 2009). 
However, Suwat Thongthanakul, who is an ―editor of ASTV Manager Weekly 
news magazine, a mouthpiece publication of the yellow-shirt People‘s Alliance for 
Democracy (PAD)‖ (as cited in Rojanaphruk, 2011, para. 6) countered: 
The media‘s role must be different from the past…. We must choose 
sides, choose the righteous side in order to protect national interests … 
media must not be satisfied with merely being a messenger. It must 
perform the functions of a gatekeeper and censor on what it thinks the 
public ought not to read, watch or hear. (as cited in Rojanaphruk, 
2011, para. 7) 
 
In addition, evidence indicates that news and information about the PAD can be 
retrieved from Manager Online. For example, when the PAD organized protests, it 
declared reasons and standing points of the protests to the public. The PAD delivered 
56 announcements and declarations. All of these documents can be found at Manager 
Online (ASTV Manager Online, 2008).  
Matichon and its associated newspapers asserted that they were quality 
newspapers and did not take sides. Furthermore, Matichon asked other newspapers to 
use their influence to create unity within Thai society. As Boonlert Kachayuthadej, 
who is a journalist and adviser to Matichon, argued:  
―Right now, are we biased and prejudiced due to our love and hatred, 
or not?‖… ―Are we going to deny that news headlines are biased and 
prejudiced?‖... [T]he past five years or so had seen the emergence of a 
political mass media with its own goals and ideologies. Some resorted 
to giving political opponents degrading names, like calling the now 
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detained red-shirt co-leader Jatuporn Promphan a ―toad.‖ The situation 
is messy and there are no standards to be followed any longer. (as 
cited in Rojanaphruk, 2011, para. 3) 
 
On the other hand, the Matichon group was criticized that it might take sides, 
in favor of the UDD and the PTP. During the 2011 election campaign, an email was 
forwarded to many media. The email asked the media to promote the PTP. However, 
the email account owner denied sending it and explained that this email account was 
available for all reporters to follow the PTP‘s campaign schedules. Therefore, 
someone used this account and forwarded the email to the media (ASTV Manager 
Daily, 2011a; ―Reveal,‖ 2011). The National Press Council investigated this case and 
seemed to doubt the Matichon group taking sides to support the PTP. However, the 
Matichon group insisted on its innocence and disagreed with the results of the 
investigation. It argued that the council was prejudiced and arbitrarily created a new 
investigation issue in order to make the Matichon group appear guilty. Therefore, the 
group did not accept investigation results and resigned from the council 
(―Committee,‖ 2011; ―Matichon,‖ 2011). However, the Manager group argued that 
the Matichon group could not defend itself; therefore, it resigned rather than appealed 
this case (ASTV Manager Daily, 2011b). 
Radio and television. 
 Community radio and alternative television have been widely used by the 
PAD, the UDD, and both sides‘ supporters to communicate with people. In 2009, 
there were 5,500 registered and 100-200 unregistered community radio stations 
throughout the country (the National Telecommunications Commission as cited in 
Krungthep Turakij Online, 2009). During the political conflict, community radio and 
alternative television were monitored. For example, in 2009, the military controlled 
245 radio and 2 television stations (Chambers, 2010, p. 848). It monitored and shut 
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down especially those radio stations that broadcasted lese majesty and aggravated the 
situation (Dalpino, 2011, p. 159).  
 However, the government has used the mainstream radio and television 
stations to deliver information to the public. During the conflict, the government 
explained the situation, expressed its concerns, and communicated with people and 
protestors through radio and television. When a crisis took place, the government 
declared states of emergency to the public through the radio and television. Therefore, 
Thais knew what they should do and protestors knew what the government was 
concerned about and requested them to do. 
At present, there are no protests. Mainstream television stations, especially a 
state-owned channel, broadcast programs that create harmony and unity in society. 
For example, in August 2011, a musical titled ―The Impossible Dream‖ was broadcast 
on the National Broadcasting Services of Thailand. The musical is about a conflict in 
a rural village. Typically, villagers in this village were farmers who lived in peace. 
One day, a billionaire who had grown up in this village visited his hometown. He 
wanted to develop this agricultural village into an industrial city. Villagers were 
divided into two sides and fought each other. A village headman stopped the conflict 
between the villagers. He compared the various viewpoints of the villagers to the 
various colors of flowers, which are beautiful when in the same vase. In addition, he 
explained his point to his friend—the billionaire. He argued that agriculture suited the 
village. Modernity and prosperity did not ensure that villagers would have a better 
quality of life and happiness. As the headman argued, if we develop the village by 
ignoring our background and local wisdom, we and the village will face 
socioeconomic problems. We will preserve our peaceful village and we will pursue 
our dream to develop the village in our own ways. Finally, the billionaire understood 
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and agreed with the village headman (Sarowat, 2011). This musical was produced in 
order to appeal to Thais to live peacefully and have sufficient lives (Thai News 
Agency, 2011). 
Mainstream radio stations broadcast programs that facilitate conflict 
reconciliation. In September 2011, a radio program, Exclusive, interviewed Chaturon 
Chaisang, who was a former Deputy Prime Minister of the ex-Prime Minister Thaksin 
administration, about amnesty and reconciliation. According to Chaisang, in past 
conflicts, such as the 1992 uprising, amnesty was granted to all conflicting parties, 
including the military and protestors, without implementing a truth seeking. 
Approximately a decade later, an authority began to explore the truth about the 1992 
protest. However, the truth seeking was stopped in the middle of the process, because 
all conflicting parties were already granted amnesty. Therefore, it might be useless to 
explore the truth. However, granting amnesty for the current conflict is a controversial 
issue. Therefore, the TRCT has to investigate the truth before granting amnesty. 
However, Thai society does not have rich experience in truth seeking, so the TRCT 
needs support from experts, such as the TRCT‘s advisory team (as cited in 
Mungkornchaiya, 2011).       
According to the roles of the radio and television, mainstream radio and 
television try to counter-balance influences of alternative radio and television. The 
mainstream media broadcast programs that promote harmony and unity in society. 
However, the public also needs cooperation from the alternative media to promote 
these issues. 
Social media. 
Social media are highly used as the other media. There are many websites in 
Thailand and abroad that support the PAD and the UDD. In 2010, the government 
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censored 612 websites that aggravated conflict. These censored sites have posted on 
their homepages ―[t]his website has been blocked by ICT [Ministry of Information 
and Communication Technology] & TOT [Thai State-Owned Telecommunications 
company]‖ (―ICT,‖ 2010, para. 1; Thairath Online as cited in ―Censor,‖ 2010). In 
addition, the government has closed 43,000 websites with lese majesty content 
(―Three Ministries,‖ 2010). Currently, the Yingluck government ordered the police to 
set up a war room to follow websites with lese majesty content (Sattaburuth, 2011). 
Moreover, Facebook and Twitter have been used for political purposes. For 
example, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin always communicated with the UDD during its 
rallies and protests through social media and video links. Social media made him 
maintain influence in people‘s minds. These technologies allowed him to 
communicate with people in real time. His supporters and opponents perceived that he 
was existing and talking in front of them (Charoensinolarn, 2010, pp. 320-321). 
Moreover, ex-Prime Minister Thaksin used Skype to talk with the Yingluck‘s cabinet 
in a cabinet meeting. He urged the cabinet to execute the government policy. Some 
people criticized that he interfered with the government, stating that his action 
constituted a ―Thaksin thinks and the cabinet do‖ relationship (Political Team, 2011c, 
p. 3). However, Prime Minister Yingluck stated that ex-Prime Minister Thaksin did 
not interfere with the government, but he just greeted and encouraged the cabinet to 
devote themselves to working hard for the people (Political Team, 2011c, p. 3).   
 In addition, some Thais use Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and chat rooms in order 
to express their political views and share them with the public. Social media provide 
convenient, available two-way communication. Not only ex-Prime Minister Thaksin 
uses social media, but many politicians and parties also use them to communicate 
with the public. Ex-Prime Minister Abhisit, Prime Minister Yingluck, the DP, and the 
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PTP use Facebook. They have many supporters who follow them on Facebook. From 
the 2011 election campaign to the present, ex-Prime Minister Abihisit has delivered 
his messages to the public called, ―From the bottom of my heart to all Thais‖ 
(Vejjajiva as cited in Prachatai, 2011). There are eight messages posted on his 
Facebook and 833,178 people ―like‖ his posts. Prime Minister Yingluck has used 
Facebook for election campaigns and to inform the public about the government‘s 
work. There are 482,959 people posting ―like‖ on her Facebook page.  
 Evidence shows that politicians and the people have used social media for 
political purposes. However, the use of social media has disadvantages. For instance, 
some opinions and information that people shared on blogs and chat rooms were not 
reliable. Moreover, some information created misunderstandings among the public 
(Yong as cited in ASTV Manager Online, 2009). In addition, some websites presented 
―materials [deemed] too sensitive in the political climate‖ (Dalpino, 2011, p. 159). 
These websites have been censored.  
The media play major roles in influencing the society. Alternative and social 
media are popular with the government, conflicting parties, and Thais to express their 
opinions to the public, and they are convenient for supporters to follow these 
messages. Some media might take sides, but this is their right as long as they do not 
violate the law. Some media deliver sensitive and inappropriate contents, which can 
worsen an already tense situation. However, in the divided society, Thais need 
reconciliation and unity; therefore, the media should consider these issues and adjust 
their roles. They should play positive roles to lead the public to accomplish a united 
and peaceful society rather than divide people and aggravate the situation. 
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Interviews 
 The researcher conducted interviews with six Thais, including a scholar and 
five ordinary Thai people in order to acquire their opinions about conflict 
transformation and peace building. These interviews were conducted in Bangkok, 
Thailand. The study first aimed to interview Professor Satha-Anand, because he is an 
expert on peace and conflict transformation. The other five interviewees were people 
whom the researcher randomly requested to participate in the interviews. There were 
two females and three males. Their ages ranged between 20 and 60 years old. The 
study used qualitative interviews with four open-ended questions. The interviews 
were face-to-face interviews. 
The researcher‘s topic is a sensitive and controversial issue in Thailand; 
therefore, in order to protect interviewees‘ privacy and confidentiality, these 
interviews were anonymous. Interviewees‘ identities were not informed individually. 
The interviewees were given pseudonyms, including Ms. Sri Nalini, Ms. Ruji Won, 
Mr. Pawin Smith, Mr. Puri Niti, and Mr. Jarun Satid. However, Professor Satha-
Anand allowed this study to indicate his name. He is a faculty member of the Political 
Science Department at Thammasat University. He is an expert in nonviolence and the 
politics of peace and conflict. His academic works are well known in Thailand and 
internationally. Moreover, shortly after the researcher interviewed him, he joined the 
TRCT‘s advisory team in September 2011.  
The other five interviewees consisted of a freelance researcher, a graduate 
student, an instructor, an office worker, and an officer. Their ages ranged from the 20s 
to the 50s. In addition, they shared different political views. Three interviewees 
seemed to support either the PAD or UDD. Two people seemed to be neutral. All of 
them used to participate in protests. Some interviewees participated in both the PAD 
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and the UDD protests. According to their background, they were studying and 
working in Bangkok. However, two of them are originally from Bangkok, whereas 
the other three interviewees are from other provinces. They represent the Bangkok 
and rural middle class. These five interviewees were chosen because they shared 
different genders, ages, backgrounds, occupations, and perspectives. However, this 
interview population is small because many people were uncomfortable in 
participating in such a political interview. They simply provided a random sampling 
of attitudes and perceptions. When the researcher asked for interview permission from 
the Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the 
University of San Francisco, the researcher committed to not disclosing the 
interviewees‘ identities individually in this paper. 
Interview questions and findings. 
 The researcher used four open-ended questions to ask interviewees their 
opinions on the current conflict. The questions and interview results were as follows: 
1. Since 2006, there have been large-scale protests by the PAD and the UDD 
in Bangkok, Thailand. Do you agree or disagree with the PAD and the UDD leaders 
organizing the protests in order to put pressure on the Thai government? 
The majority of the interviewees agreed that people have rights to protest 
under the rule of law and must commit to nonviolence. Five interviewees, including 
Ms. Nalini, Ms. Won, Mr. Smith, Mr. Niti, and Mr. Satid, agreed that protests are 
political rights of all Thais. People have the right to monitor the political scene, and 
express their voices and demands to the public under the rule of law and using 
nonviolent means. Mr. Smith admitted to occupying symbolic streets, which related to 
Thai democratic history, such as Ratchadamnoen Streets and Democracy Monument, 
and believed that this was acceptable. This was civil disobedience and could be 
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considered nonviolent. However, the five interviewees disagreed with the PAD and 
the UDD taking over the Government House, airports, commercial areas, as well as 
using women and children as human shields, and using all kinds of violent means. In 
addition, Mr. Smith added, the protests should not be unending protests; for example, 
the PAD spent 193 days and the UDD spent 67 days protesting against the 
government. The five interviewees asserted that the protests abused other people‘s 
rights, caused trouble to the public, and worsened the country‘s image and reputation. 
Professor Satha-Anand further explained that there are four important aspects 
about the current conflict. First, the current conflict is different from previous 
conflicts, which were conflicts between Thais and the government. But the current 
conflict is a conflict between two gigantic social movements, the PAD and the UDD, 
in other words, conflict between Thais and Thais. This is an ―unprecedented‖ conflict 
within the nation. People have been divided into two sides. This ―divisiveness‖ is in 
almost all organizations, such as families, universities, and military groups. Second, 
the PAD and the UDD acquires huge support from large numbers of people because 
they link with two big political parties, the DP and the PTP, respectively. In the 2011 
election, the DP acquired more than 11 million party list votes, whereas the PTP 
acquired more than 15 million votes. If only 10 percent of each party‘s supporters 
joined the protests, the PAD and the UDD members would number more than 1 
million people. Third, the PAD and the UDD own media and have other media 
supporting them. Fourth, the PAD and the UDD acquire support from elites. Elites of 
each side have conflicts of interest with the other side.    
2. Do you agree or disagree that even though there were large-scale protests of 
the PAD and the UDD, Thai society could handle them because there was not massive 
violence, such as civil war, taking place as in some countries? 
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The professor, Mr. Niti, and Mr. Satid pointed out that the society could not 
manage the conflicts; therefore, violence took place. This resulted in losses, injuries, 
and deaths to protestors, officers, and innocent bystanders. However, Mr. Smith, Ms. 
Nalini, and Ms. Won argued that, comparing the current conflict with conflicts in 
other countries, the current conflict has less violent than that found in many countries.   
Professor Satha-Anand acknowledged that the government, the PAD, and the 
UDD tried to use nonviolent means, but they were not purely nonviolent movements. 
They controlled militia groups. Therefore, in tense situations, violence broke out, such 
as in the clash between the PAD and the police in October 2008, and in the clashes 
between the UDD and soldiers in April and May 2010. In the latter case, the soldiers 
tried to use nonviolent means, but violence broke out because unidentified forces 
started to use violence first. This situation caused injuries and deaths to the protestors, 
soldiers, and others.     
The other five interviewees admitted violence took place in the society. Ms. 
Nalini believed the PAD was not absolutely nonviolent. Ms. Nalini and Mr. Niti 
believed that the UDD used violence and created riots. Ms. Nalini and Ms. Won 
added that the UDD leaders aroused protestors‘ emotions to create violence. This 
exacerbated the situation and expanded the conflicts. As Mr. Niti asserted, some 
media outlets take sides. This influenced people‘s attitudes and worsened the 
situation. Ms. Nalini and Mr. Niti added that the government tried to compromise 
with the UDD, for example, through negotiations. However, the negotiations were 
failures.  
On the other hand, Ms. Nalini, Ms. Won, and Mr. Smith argued that Thai 
society managed the conflict better than many countries. They believed other 
countries will not be patient with civil disorder and allow unending protests to take 
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place in their countries. However, Mr. Satid added that Thai society has to learn from 
these past mistakes and cannot allow violence to happen again in the future. 
3. Do you agree or disagree that some people might be persuaded and 
manipulated by the PAD or the UDD leaders in order to make them participate in the 
protests? 
All interviewees asserted this point. The professor affirmed these protests 
were the large-scale actions of two social movements; therefore, mobilizations were 
unavoidable. Moreover, the PAD and the UDD used their media to mobilize their 
supporters and prevented them from being persuaded by the media of the other side. 
Mr. Smith and Mr. Niti also confirmed the media issues. 
Mr. Smith agreed that the PAD and the UDD leaders played a major role to 
persuade people to participate in the protests. Protestors believed and had faith in their 
leaders. Ms. Won believed that rural leaders had influenced rural people‘s decisions. 
Moreover, some people donated to and supported the protests, such as providing 
transportation in order to deliver people to join the protests. 
Mr. Niti agreed with this question. Some protestors believed all information 
that the leaders told them and the public. These protestors did not check the reliability 
of the information and were convinced by the leaders. Mr. Niti further explained that 
he has friends from the two groups. When he discussed the conflict with them, they 
talked about the same issues that the leaders did. When he challenged them with new 
aspects or questions, his friends could not answer, but could only reiterate the same 
ideas. In addition, he believed some protestors might be persuaded by incentives. 
Therefore, the society has to evaluate the motive of the protestors, not only the 
number of protestors. 
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Ms. Nalini admitted that she used to join the protests on both sides. The PAD 
leaders persuaded the public, but they used evidence to support their arguments. The 
UDD leaders seemed to persuade people by arousing their emotions to love and 
hatred. Some people who had limited access to other information were easily 
persuaded. In addition, some protestors might receive incentives. For example, she 
had a chance to talk with a taxi driver. The driver said he and his wife had protest 
group member cards, so they received some incentives when they joined the protests. 
Ms. Won and Mr. Satid admitted that there was news about incentive issues on 
both sides, such as providing transportation. Ms. Won believed the leaders used 
various methods to persuade people to protest against the government. However, Mr. 
Satid countered that the society did not have evidence to prove this issue; therefore, 
we should not conclude that the PAD and the UDD used incentives. 
4. During the 2011 election campaign, creating harmony in Thai society was a 
major issue proposed by many parties. Two controversial topics were should the ex-
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra be granted amnesty and pardon. What are your 
opinions about these two topics? 
All interviewees affirmed reconciliation is necessary. But they shared different 
opinions.  
Mr. Smith believed if amnesty and pardon are conducted under existing laws, 
resistance from the society may not take place or may not be strong. But if new laws 
need to be legislated in order to pardon some people, this may result in new protests. 
Mr. Smith‘s opinions were similar to Ms. Nalini‘s, Ms. Won‘s, and Mr. Niti‘s, but 
were opposite to Mr. Satid‘s. Furthermore, Ms. Nalini, Ms. Won, and Mr. Niti 
asserted the society must respect the rule of law. Everyone who violated laws should 
be punished. Moreover, Mr. Niti disagreed with granting amnesty and pardon for the 
63 
 
 
PAD and the UDD, who violated laws. On the contrary, Mr. Satid countered that 
amnesty and pardon must be done without a political intervention.  
The professor further explained reconciliation with a broader perspective. 
Reconciliation in Thailand involves both ―non-electoral democracy,‖ and ―electoral 
democracy.‖ These two powers have to reconcile with each other. The conflicts take 
place because the two powers could not reconcile. Non-electoral democratic powers 
believe that some rural Thais do not possess democratic power. In other words, they 
believe that the democratic power does not belong to the people, but to politicians. 
Some of the rural poor possess democratic power for only four seconds when they 
decide to vote on an election day. They are ignorant and vote because they favor 
populist policies. Ms. Nalini and Mr. Niti believed some rural people have limited 
access to information. Therefore, they are easily persuaded.  
Mr. Smith suggested Thais should see conflict in positive ways. Thai people 
should accept each other and live together in peace even though they have different 
ideologies. This will result in a two party system, including the DP and the PTP. The 
DP should rebrand itself in order to acquire more public support and compete with the 
PTP. In addition, Mr. Satid added that the media play a major role to support 
reconciliation. Some media should change their roles from aggravating the situation 
and dividing people to encouraging harmony and reconciliation. 
Summary 
 At present, there is not any protest in Thailand; however, the conflict has not 
been transformed yet and deep-rooted conflict exists in Thai society. The government 
has tried to resolve the conflict. This challenging work was transferred from the 
Abhisit to the Yingluck administration. The Yingluck government declared 
reconciliation, rehabilitation, and truth seeking as urgent policies. However, some 
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Thais, especially the DP and the PAD, doubt that the government pays much attention 
to these urgent policies, rather than trying to assist ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. In 
addition, the ex-prime minister may interfere with the government. Therefore, in order 
to avoid further conflict, the government has to prove that it commits to conflict 
transformation and national interest rather than individual interest. 
The public also plays major roles in reconciliation and peace building. The 
media are criticized about taking sides and dividing people rather than encouraging 
reconciliation and peace building. People want harmony and unity in the country, but 
some of them do not open their minds and accept the other side. These situations 
discourage reconciliation. Therefore, in order to transform the conflict and build 
peace in the nation, the society has to see conflict in positive ways and commit to 
conflict transformation and peace building.     
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CHAPTER V  
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Discussion 
The current conflict has vast effects on the society. This conflict has lasted for 
six years and it needs to be ended through transforming the crisis to create a peaceful 
society. The findings of this study and previous literature support the research 
question and hypothesis that reconciliation, rehabilitation, and the narrowing of 
socioeconomic gaps can transform the current Thai political conflict and build peace 
in Thai society.  
Reconciliation  
Thai society is still divided into two sides, including those for and against ex-
Prime Minister Thaksin. As Satha-Anand affirmed, divisiveness exists in the society. 
For example, families, universities, and the media illustrate the effects of the divided 
society on a smaller scale (personal communication, September 8, 2011). 
Divisiveness obstructs reconciliation, which aims for conflicting parties to come 
together in order to transform painful past experiences into harmonized and united 
relationships (Lederach, 2003a). Important players need to be discussed, including the 
UDD, the government, the media, the PAD, and Thai society. 
Currently, the UDD cannot settle into an appropriate role. Even though their 
demands are fulfilled, and the 2011 election took place, and the PTP successfully 
formed a government, it still creates new conflicts for the society. The UDD‘s roles 
conflict with the government reconciliation policy. It should not become a guardian of 
the government and intimidate the society. The inappropriate roles of the UDD 
reiterate divisiveness in the society. The UDD leaders should acknowledge the 
government policy and commit to reconciliation, rather than create new conflicts for 
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the society. In addition, it should acknowledge the statement of ex-Prime Minister 
Thaksin that he hopes the government can create a united and peaceful society to 
celebrate the king‘s 84th birthday (Traisuriyathanma, 2011).  
The government declares it will transform the conflict and build peace in the 
country. However, the transformation process is not yet implemented. Some Thais 
may not trust the government‘s sincerity to implement the reconciliation policy. Prime 
Minister Yingluck and the PTP are closely related to ex-Prime Minister Thaksin. As a 
result, some people believe that the government aims to give the ex-prime minister 
amnesty rather than commit to implementing the reconciliation policy. Furthermore, 
the ex-prime minister may continually interfere with the government. Therefore, the 
government has to affirm that it is committed to national interests and reconciliation, 
rather than personal interests.  
However, there are two good signs of reconciliation in the nation. First, in 
September 2011, Prime Minister Yingluck and ex-Prime Minister Abhisit joined a 
rally for an anti-corruption campaign. The two leaders walked together at the rally. 
This showed collaboration between both leaders in order to eradicate corruption. 
Second, Thailand has been suffering severely from months of flooding. Currently, 
resolving this issue is the national agenda. All organizations in the country are 
cooperating to resolve the problem. In October 2011, the two leaders started 
cooperating and helping the flood victims. Thai society hopes these two situations 
will facilitate the nation‘s reconciliation and peace building processes (―Abhisit 
Cooperates,‖ 2011; Pongaksorn, 2011).              
Conflicting parties have used the media to deliver messages to the society. 
Various kinds of media, such as mainstream, alternative, and social media, make these 
messages available and accessible to all Thais. Therefore, the media have major roles 
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in shaping the society‘s attitudes toward the conflict. Previous literature and this 
study‘s findings have illustrated that conflicting parties have used their own media 
solely for their own support. In addition, they have other media supporting them as 
some media may take sides. Conflicting parties use the media to appeal for public 
support and persuade people to participate in the protests. The two former and the 
current prime ministers, including Thaksin, Abhisit, and Yingluck, respectively, 
maintain their influence on their supporters and conflicting parties through social 
media. The ex-Prime Minister Thaksin especially has appeared and communicated 
with his supporters and conflicting parties through social media. The social media 
make his existence relevant in Thai society, even though he has been in exile for six 
years (Charoensinolarn, 2010). In addition, many websites have delivered information 
and content that aggravate the conflict and discredit the other side. Therefore, the 
media should change their roles from being a part of the conflict to facilitating 
reconciliation and creating harmony and unity in the society (Lertratanawisute as 
cited in ASTV Manager Online, 2009; Satha-Anand as cited in ―Surakiart,‖ 2011; 
Wasi as cited in ―Unlock,‖ 2011).   
The PAD accepted the 2011 election results and has not created any 
movement against the new government. However, it continues monitoring the 
government. If the government assists ex-Prime Minister Thaksin against the rule of 
law, the PAD may return to protest. However, the PAD should not consider solely its 
own viewpoint. It should acknowledge that the TRCT is working on transforming the 
conflict to a peaceful society, and it should respect the TRCT‘s proposal regarding 
these issues. 
Thai society has to see the conflict in positive ways. Conflict leads to change 
in Thai society. The current conflict is taking place because there are problems in the 
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country, such as socioeconomic gaps, vote buying, and corruption. Therefore, this is a 
chance to resolve these problems. Unfortunately, some Thais do not perceive the 
conflict in positive ways. Some Thais do not accept other people who think differently 
from them. For example, the PAD and the UDD do not accept the other‘s demands. 
They perceive that they are adversaries and have to fight against each other rather 
than respecting the other‘s opinions and living together in peaceful ways (Wasi as 
cited in ―Unlock,‖ 2011). In addition, some media stimulated people‘s emotions to 
anger and hatred toward the other side (Yong as cited in ASTV Manager Online, 
2009). Protest leaders stimulated protestors‘ feelings rather than committing to 
nonviolent means. The society already learned that the use of violence cannot resolve 
the conflict, and that it only leads to a cycle of violence and continuing conflict that 
exists today. Therefore, Thais have to consciously change their attitudes toward the 
conflict and conflicting parties. They should open their minds in order to understand 
the other side. People can think differently, but they can also be friends, not enemies. 
Conflicting parties can live together peacefully in the same society and try to resolve 
conflict by nonviolent means (Coy, 2009; Fisher et al., 2000; King, n.d.; Lederach, 
2003a; Miall, 2004; Satha-Anand, 1999).        
Previous literature and this study‘s findings have illustrated some initial 
models, which could transform the conflict. Satha-Anand‘s proposal is compatible 
with the current situation. Two main actors that are non-electoral democratic powers 
and electoral democratic powers have to reconcile with each other. This proposal can 
link to Miall (2004), who discussed types of conflict transformation. First, the two 
groups of powers have to adjust the power structure. For example, ex-Prime Minister 
Thaksin exercised hard power and caused conflict in the society (Traisuriyathanma, 
2011). Currently, the PTP leads the government; therefore, the government and non-
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electoral democratic powers have to settle on appropriate power relationships with 
each other. Second, there are two issues that have to be transformed by integrating the 
rule of law and the majority vote. Tejapira challenged the society to integrate these 
two issues (as cited in ―The War,‖ 2010). The rule of law pursues a clean democracy 
without vote buying and corruption. The majority vote asks the society to respect 
people‘s decisions. Both are fundamental issues for democracy; therefore, the society 
should recognize the negative effects of vote buying and corruption and eradicate 
them. As a result, the society will be able to effectively integrate the two methods 
together. Third, conflicting parties should open their minds to perceive the conflict in 
positive ways. This will facilitate conflict transformation.  
Socioeconomic Gaps 
Divisiveness can be seen in other relationships, such as this relationship 
between the middle class and the poor, as well as between urban and rural areas. The 
majority of the middle class in urban areas support the PAD. On the contrary, the 
majority of the impoverished in rural areas support the UDD. These kinds of 
relationships represent socioeconomic gaps.  
Previous literature and the findings have asserted that social inequality affects 
politics, such as vote buying, corruption, populist policies, and political mobilization. 
For example, vote buying is pervasive in rural areas. The poor are the majority of 
Thais; therefore, politicians who can buy votes may win an election (Callahan, 2005; 
Laothammatas as cited in ―Democratic,‖ n.d.). Vote buying leads to corruption issues 
in the country. These two factors led to the PAD protests against the Thaksin 
government.  
However, there might be other reasons that caused conflicting parties to 
overthrow the Thaksin administration. Ex-Prime Minister Thaksin accepted that when 
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he was in office, he exercised hard power and was not concerned with people‘s 
feelings; therefore, his actions created conflict in the society (Traisuriyathanma, 
2011). This issue could be another reason that made conflicting parties overthrow 
him. However, conflicting parties did not mention this issue to the public, but they 
instead used the corruption issue as a reason to topple him.  
Social disparity also affected political mobilization. As Satha-Anand 
explained, some people might be mobilized or persuaded in order to participate in the 
two social movements of the PAD and the UDD (personal communication, September 
8, 2011). For example, some Thais suspected that the UDD‘s protestors and security 
guards were hired (Pittaway, 2010; Ruangdit, 2010; Walker & Farrelly, 2010). 
According to the interview results, all interviewees believed that some people were 
persuaded by various means, such as by providing transportation and bribing them, to 
join the protests. However, the society and scholars should reflect before judging the 
use of financial inducements to mobilize people to participate in the protests for two 
reasons. First, some people wanted to join the protests, but they did not have the 
financial capacity to do so. For example, grassroots protestors had to commute from 
rural areas to participate in the protests in Bangkok. They could not afford 
transportation fees and other costs associated with taking part in the protests. When 
they were provided the financial means to do so, they could join the protests as they 
wanted. In contrast, some people who would not have otherwise been inclined to 
participate in the protests were effectively bribed through financial incentives; 
therefore, they decided to join the protests in order to make money. The two cases are 
very different; therefore, scholars should further investigate how many protestors 
were there because they believed in the cause and how many people were there 
because they were bribed.              
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According to previous literature, however, some scholars shared different 
views. Hewison (2010) and Winichakul (2008) argued, many in the urban middle 
class have a bias against the rural grassroots protestors and politicians. Many in the 
middle class believe that the grassroots protestors are uneducated and ignorant and the 
politicians corrupt. These discourses were created in order to affirm that democracy 
―can only be achieved through moral and ethical rule‖ (Winichakul as cited in 
Hewison, 2010, p. 125). Moreover, Hewison (2010) argued, the current conflict is a 
conflict between the old oligarchy and Thaksin. When Thaksin was a prime minister, 
he created many drastic changes within the country. These changes challenged the 
power of the old oligarchy. On the contrary, other studies illustrated that conflicting 
parties tried to involve the old oligarchy and the institution of monarchy into the 
conflict for several reasons. The PAD requested the institution to exercise power that 
was based on Article 7 of the Constitution to appoint a prime minister to replace the 
ex-Prime Minister Thaksin, but the PAD was criticized that its request was 
inappropriate. The PAD argued that it protected the institution. However, the PAD 
had ―several factions‖ (Hewison, 2010, p. 125). Some PAD leaders might have had a 
conflict of interest with the Thaksin government; therefore, these leaders fought 
against the ex-prime minister. As Princess Sirindhorn explained, the PAD‘s 
movements did not relate to the institution (AP as cited in Rojanaphruk, 2008). 
Moreover, some media have presented contents with lese majesty. The media wants to 
aggravate the situation rather than commit to conflict reconciliation and 
transformation. These cases show the conflicting parties, and scholars even tried to 
involve the institution in the conflict. As Tejapira (2011a) insisted, conflicting parties 
must not involve the institution in the conflict (p. 53). On the contrary, the institution 
has not been involved in the conflict because the institution has committed to the rule 
72 
 
 
of law to maintain a neutral status, above partisan politics. Therefore, Hewison‘s view 
about the old oligarchy should be reviewed. 
Even though there are different views of scholars concerning vote buying and 
corruption, these two problems continue to grow in the society. Hewison (2010) and 
Winichakul (2008) seemed to ignore these problems and appeal to the society to 
respect the majority voice. However, these problems need to be resolved. The 
problems may be resolved by narrowing socioeconomic gaps between the middle 
class and the poor, and between urban and rural areas. The government uses populist 
policies to attempt to solve these problems. However, some scholars argued that the 
populist policies will create budget burdens in the long term, over the next few 
decades, and make rural people become dependent rather than become self-reliant. 
For example, in the case of populist policies in Argentina and Greece, the two 
countries suffered from populist policies (Boonma, 2011; Plainthit, 2011).  
The NRC and the NRA play major roles in proposing long-term, sustainable 
policies for narrowing the socioeconomic gaps (Admin, 2010a, 2010b; Dalpino, 2010; 
Online Reporters, 2010). Therefore, the government should pay attention to the 
proposals of the two independent bodies. It may implement the populist policies 
together with the long-term sustainable policies to eradicate socioeconomic 
disparities. In addition, the government, the NRC, and the NRA could explore these 
effects of the populist policies in order to understand their advantages and 
disadvantages and prevent long-term budget burdens. Therefore, the government 
could learn which policies are useful for people or create budget burdens. As a result, 
the government could implement the populist policies properly. 
An important point concerning populist policies is making the poor become 
dependent rather than self-reliant. The main advantages of populist policies are 
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immediately to respond to the demands of the poor and alleviate poverty by providing 
resources and a budget to serve the poor. However, if the government and people do 
not manage these resources well, the government may waste a budget and the rural 
poor could become dependent. Some of the poor may perceive that the government 
will continually provide these free resources to them. As a result, they just rely on 
these supports. In addition, if some people do not have self-discipline, they may 
consume all these resources instead of investing and saving. Therefore, the 
government and the impoverished have to pay attention to these issues. The 
government should have plans and manage the populist policies well. It may develop 
efficient aiding programs which provide grants and loans to help the poor. For 
example, the government may improve projects, such as village funds, people‘s 
banks, small and medium enterprises (SMEs), and infrastructure. In addition, people 
should have self-discipline and be self-reliant, which corresponds with the 
―Sufficiency Economy‖ philosophy that was initiated by King Rama IX (National 
Economic and Social Development Broad [NESDB], n.d., p. 1).  
According to NESDB (n.d.), the Sufficiency Economy philosophy encourages 
Thais to follow the middle path and become self-reliant. The philosophy is based on 
three principles, including ―moderation,‖ ―reasonableness,‖ and ―self-immunity‖ (p. 
2). Moderation and reasonableness encourage people to manage and spend their 
income carefully. They should avoid over spending and extravagance. As a result, 
people will have money left for investing and saving. Self-immunity is encouraging 
people to be aware of the negative economic impact; for example, consumerism may 
cause people to carelessly spend money and even sink in debt. Therefore, if Thais, 
especially the impoverished, follow the philosophy, they could have a better quality of 
life, become self-reliant, and even become prosperous.                   
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Moreover, this could be a good opportunity for the government, the NRC, and 
the NRA to examine causes of social and economic inequalities. These problems may 
derive from global and Thai economic policies. These policies might aim to develop 
urban areas and the economic sector rather than rural areas and the agricultural sector. 
As a result of unbalanced development, socioeconomic disparities and development 
gaps take place. Therefore, the government should implement balanced development, 
which concentrates on both the urban and rural sectors.     
Rehabilitation 
During the past six years, violence took place in the society and caused several 
losses, injuries, and deaths to protestors, officers, and others (C. Satha-Anand, 
personal communication, September 8, 2011). This conflict‘s wounds need to be 
cured. Rehabilitation has to be implemented with reconciliation. The society has to 
define appropriate justice based on the spectrum of the rule of law and amnesty. The 
research proposes that society may apply Buddhist principles for rehabilitation (Wasi 
as cited in ―Unlock,‖ 2011). Buddhist principles may help the society settle its 
position between the rule of law and amnesty. If the society believes in reciprocal 
deeds, the rule of law may be enforced. If the society wants to forgive and forget, 
amnesty may be granted. According to the chair of the TRCT, he admitted that 
negative justice which aims to punish wrongdoers cannot transform the conflict. The 
TRCT is committed to positive justice which aims at rehabilitation and prevention of 
a new conflict (Na-Nakorn as cited in ―Introduce,‖ n.d.).  
Conclusions 
 Conflict transformation is needed for Thai society. However, the society is not 
committed to facilitate reconciliation. Even though there is not any protest, the society 
still maintains deep polarization. Conflicting parties and some Thais do not open their 
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minds to perceive the conflict in positive ways. This situation seems that conflicting 
parties temporarily stop fighting, and then prepare for the next fight to overthrow the 
other side. The chair of the NRA is aware of this point and has requested the society 
to change its way of thinking. Thais can think differently from each other, but Thais 
have to learn to live together in harmony and unity.  
The government and the TRCT play major roles to implement reconciliation 
and rehabilitation. However, the society may doubt the government about 
concentrating on ex-Prime Minister Thaksin‘s issues rather than reconciliation. If the 
government aims to assist the ex-prime minister, a new conflict may take place in the 
society. Therefore, the government has to prove that it commits to transforming the 
conflict and does not intervene in the legal process. Two good signs are that the prime 
minister and the opposition leader have cooperated in order to eradicate corruption 
and help with flood relief. These two situations could be defined as the starting of 
reconciliation within electoral democratic powers. If the two leaders could further 
develop their collaboration in reconciliation, this will largely contribute to the 
reconciliation process in the society. 
According to non-electoral democratic powers, the media have influence to 
shape people‘s attitudes. The mainstream media support reconciliation policy. They 
try to create harmony and unity in the country. The alternative and social media 
outlets should recognize these issues. They have to stop dividing people and making 
conflicting parties to angry and hateful towards the other. They have to commit to the 
national interest rather than the groups‘ interests. 
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Recommendations 
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This study is a primary research that concentrates on transforming the current 
Thai political conflict and building peace in the society. The research is conducted at 
the same time of the current conflict. The study provides some suggestions which 
could facilitate conflict transformation and peace building. Therefore, future research 
may explore the conflict transformation process in order to understand what factors 
contribute to the success or failure of the conflict transformation process. 
 In addition, a future study may examine post-conflict conditions. For example, 
future research could investigate the results of the conflict transformation to Thai 
society: Does peace take place in the society? How does the society learn from the 
conflict? The future research may investigate the evolution of the conflict: Is the 
conflict completely transformed or does it create a new conflict in the society?  
 Moreover, future researchers may use the results of this study to understand 
politics in other countries which share similar political conditions with Thailand. 
Future research could apply the case of the current Thai political conflict to prevent 
conflicts that may take place in those countries.  
Recommendations for Educational Practice 
 This research may provide some information for educational practice. 
Universities could expand their areas of focus in politics of peace and conflict to 
concentrate in Southeast Asia and East Asia regions. Some countries in Southeast 
Asia are in the process of political development. Political conflicts take place in some 
countries, for example, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand. In addition, there are 
conflicts between these countries, for instance, border conflict between Cambodia and 
Thailand concerning the case of the Phra Viharn Temple. Moreover, border conflicts 
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take place among six countries in Southeast and East Asia concerning the case of the 
Spratly Islands. 
Furthermore, universities could develop courses or workshops which focus on 
conflict transformation. These courses may provide fundamental knowledge and skills 
for scholars to understand some recent conflicts of the world and could be able to 
propose some solutions to transform those conflicts. 
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Appendix A 
Human Subjects Approval 
The researcher acquired approval to conduct interviews from the Institutional 
Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) at the University of 
San Francisco. A copy of the IRBPHS approval letter can be found in Appendix B.  
In order to prevent risk and maintain the privacy and confidentiality of 
interviewees, the names of the five interviewees are pseudonyms. Professor Satha-
Anand allowed the study to mention his name. In addition, the study records will be 
kept confidential by locking interview notes in a safe. No individual identities will be 
specifically used in any reports or publications resulting from the study. The study 
information will be coded and kept in locked files at all times. Only the researcher 
will have access to the files. 
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Appendix B 
From USF IRBPHS irbphs@usfca.edu  
To rphumcharoen@usfca.edu 
Cc Stephen Zunes <Zunes@usfca.edu> 
Date Thu, Aug 11, 2011 at 8:20 AM 
Subject IRB Application #11-078 - Approved 
Mailed-by usfca.edu 
Important mainly because of the people in the conversation. 
 
August 11, 2011 
 
Dear Ranatchai Phumcharoen: 
 
The Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects (IRBPHS) 
at the University of San Francisco (USF) has reviewed your request for human 
subjects approval regarding your study. 
 
Your application has been approved by the committee (IRBPHS #11-078). Please 
note the following: 
 
1. Approval expires twelve (12) months from the dated noted above. At that 
time, if you are still in collecting data from human subjects, you must file 
a renewal application. 
 
2. Any modifications to the research protocol or changes in instrumentation 
(including wording of items) must be communicated to the IRBPHS. 
Re-submission of an application may be required at that time. 
 
3. Any adverse reactions or complications on the part of participants must 
be reported (in writing) to the IRBPHS within ten (10) working days. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact the IRBPHS at (415) 422-6091. 
 
On behalf of the IRBPHS committee, I wish you much success in your research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Terence Patterson, EdD, ABPP 
Chair, Institutional Review Board for the Protection of Human Subjects 
-------------------------------------------------- 
IRBPHS – University of San Francisco 
Counseling Psychology Department 
Education Building – Room 017 
2130 Fulton Street 
San Francisco, CA 94117-1080 
(415) 422-6091 (Message) 
(415) 422-5528 (Fax) 
irbphs@usfca.edu 
-------------------------------------------------- 
http://www.usfca.edu/soe/students/irbphs/ 
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Appendix C 
Researcher’s profile 
The researcher is a master‘s student in the International Studies Program at the 
University of San Francisco. He is originally from Thailand. He is interested in the 
current Thai political conflict and would like to find the means of transforming the 
conflict and building peace in the country. The researcher hopes his study will 
illustrate the need to end the political conflict and to work toward sustainable peaceful 
reconciliation and transformation.  
